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Chapter 1: Introduction 
   1.1 Problem area 
"The EU is not a social union," was the statement made by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel 
when she visited London in February 2014 (Deutsche Welle:23.05.2014). At the same occasion she 
stated that the EU should allow free movement within European borders, but not grant welfare 
benefits for every immigrant. She clarified it by saying: “If the consequence of the free movement 
would be that everyone seeking work in Europe has the possibility to go to Germany and receive the 
same benefits as those who have for long been unemployed in Germany after 20-30-40 years of work, 
it is not that interpretation of the free movement I want”  (Politiken:28.02.14). The German 
Chancellor’s statement was a comment in the debate on “welfare tourism" - a debate that has been 
ongoing between the EU member states over the last few years (Deutsche Welle:23.05.2014). 
 
Other political leaders in the European member states have expressed the same opinion. For 
instance, the Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt stated at one of her press conferences in 
March 2014, that the EU is not supposed to be a social union (Press conference, Copenhagen: 
11.03.2014). She furthermore warned her listeners about a Danish uproar against the allowing their 
citizens to receive children’s benefits, pensions, unemployment benefits and education grants. The 
same message was received by the Netherlands (The Telegraph:13.09.2013) and Spain. Referencing 
this issue, the French Government declared that they want to fight “the misuse of the rules” 
concerning the free movement of persons within the EU (Berlingske:29.11.13). The UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron has expressed that he wants to cut net migration and stop those who in his 
opinion, come to Britain solely to tap its benefit system. "We're [...] making sure people come for the 
rights reasons - which has meant addressing the magnetic pull of Britain's benefits system," Cameron 
said according to EurActiv.com (EurActiv:29.07.2014). The worries and opinions of the member 
states are reactions to different judgements from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which have 
widened the scope of the rules on social benefits.  
 
These statements from political leaders from some of the bigger member states are not arbitrary. 
There has been a long political worry about the weakening of the member states’ social security 
systems and of the coordination of social benefits within the EU. In May 2013 the UK, Germany, The 
Netherlands and Austria expressed their worries in a letter to the EU chairmanship (Council of the 
European Union:31.05.2013). They called for the EU to discuss what they called “the misuse of the 
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right to move freely within the EU” and explained their worries about the “considerable additional 
costs” countries with high immigration rates have to pay because of EU citizens being granted the 
right to social benefits. However, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia later submitted a 
joint statement reminding the other member states of the importance of the Free Movement of 
Persons in this regard (Council of the European Union: 04.12.2013). In the statement they argued that 
migrants making use of their free movement have mostly been beneficial to the western member 
states and that the abuse to the generous welfare systems in the Union can be tackled effectively 
under the existing rules.  
The concerns of the western member states were discussed at a meeting of The Council of the 
European Union (Council) in the beginning of June 2013, where the Commission proposed some 
smaller initiatives to improve the instruments to manage the free movement of persons and promised 
to make a report on welfare tourisms in the EU member states (EU-oplysningen:14.03.14). But in the 
report presented in December 2013, the Commission concluded that welfare tourism is neither 
systematic nor widespread. The Commission suggested the clarification of the rules concerning the 
coordination of social security benefits for the member states, but not to change them. 
 
The difference between the critical member states’ and the Commission’s position has not become 
smaller or less obvious since then. The debate in some of the EU member states before elections for 
the European Parliament (EP) in May 2014 was characterised by a critical view on the payment of 
social security benefits to non-nationals and a fear of its consequences for the welfare of nationals. 
Some member states are taking action themselves to protect their own benefits. Germany tried to do 
it by expelling fraudulent persons of social security rules and not letting them return for five years 
(Deutsche Welle:27.08.14). Meanwhile, the UK took it a step further and adopted a law in the Spring 
demanding immigrants to earn £150 a week – equivalent to working 24 hours a week at National 
Minimum Wage - over a period of months before granting them access to social security benefits 
(Flyn:21.02.2014). The UK’s argument is that immigrants have to show that they are undertaking 
genuine and effective work in the UK. Meanwhile, the European Commission has not changed its 
position and still strictly protects the free movement of persons by ensuring compliance with EU law 
in the area. As a reaction to the new law in the UK, a spokesman from the Commission even warned 
that the Commission would “scrutinise very closely” the measures announced by the UK to ensure 
their “full compliance” with the EU law (James:19.02.14) 
 
The latest example of the difference in views on immigrants’ rights to social benefits between the 
European Commission and the member states is the Commission taking Finland to Court for 
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discriminating against workers who have worked in other member states than Finland. Finland 
requires a period of work or insurance to be completed in Finland in addition to periods completed in 
another member state in order to grant benefits (European Commission: 20.11.13). Finland was 
informed of the breach of EU law in May 2013. However, the country’s government consciously 
refused to comply with EU law in the first place, and in November 2013 was taken to Court. Thus, it 
is now up to the ECJ to rule on the matter, followed anxiously by some of the other member states 
implementing equivalent additional requirements in their national legislations. 
 
One might say that the debate is now roughly divided between the EU institutions, between those 
who want thorough rules and coordination of social benefits in the Union and those with quite 
extensive welfare systems fearing an erosion of their welfare budgets. It is therefore interesting to 
examine how the rules on social benefits have legally developed to an extent where some of the 
member states no longer agree - when they were the countries adopting the rules in the first place. 
Likewise, it raises the question of the member states’ possibilities for changing the direction of the 
EU law in a specific area if the member does not agree with its terms. Thus, our problem formulation 
is as follows: 
 
How have the rules on social benefits been expanded to an extend where some member states call 
for changes, and what possibilities do they have for rolling back the expansion? 
 
1.2. Structure of the project 
To answer our problem formulation, we will strive to understand the legal and political conflicts in 
the area of social benefits in the EU. The term social can be defined in many ways, but in this project 
it is used as a collective name for the three types of benefits that EU law contains; social security 
benefits, social assistance and social advantages. In order to understand these conflicts, we will 
conduct a cross disciplinary study between the science of law and the science of politology. We will 
start by analysing the legal development of valid law in the area of social benefits and afterwards we 
will analytically discuss the political consequences of this development and the member states’ 
possibilities on that background. Therefore, our research questions are as follows: 
 
 How has the legislation on social benefits expanded to an extend where some of the member 
states feel they need to push the brake? (legal analysis) 
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 What possibilities do the dissatisfied member states have to change or roll back the expansion of 
the legislation on the coordination of social benefits? (discussing analysis)  
 
The legal analysis will be divided in two. The first part is a legal analysis of the general 
development in the legislation on social benefits from when they were first established in EU law. In 
connection to this analysis of the legal changes we will also interpret the influence of some of the 
newest judgements’ influence on valid law concerning social benefits.  This will lead us to the second 
part that analyses how and why Finland is now being taken to court by the Commission for infringing 
EU law on the coordination of social security benefits. We will use the example of Finland as an 
exemplary in-depth analysis of a present case, which may widen the scope of the rules on social 
benefits. The combined analysis will constitute of the legal analysis and allow us to conclude on what 
is the valid law today for EU citizens’ access to social benefits. 
In the following politological discussing analysis we will analyze the challenges and possibilities 
that the legal development has faced for the member states. The discussion will begin in the results of 
the legal analysis and discuss them alongside theoretical concepts and the practical legal possibilities 
for changing EU law on the different levels. 
The legal analysis will constitute the main part of the analysis and be the most specific and 
empirical, while the discussing analysis will put the results of the legal analysis in perspective and 
outline the member states’ possibilities. Therefore, the discussing analysis will be conducted on a 
relatively general theoretical and practical level. 
 
As we conduct the two analyses separately, we will also present the two sets of theoretical concepts 
in two different chapters; one presenting the legal theory before the legal analysis and one presenting 
the politological theory before the discussing analysis. Before presenting the theory and conducting 
the analysis, we will present the methods and empirical data that act as the foundation of the project.  
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Chapter 2: Methods 
2.1 Selection of empirical data 
Our previous knowledge of social benefits in the EU was very limited. In our course EU Governance, 
we learned about the social policy in the EU but mostly focused on the soft law in the area and not 
specifically on EU citizens’ right to social benefits. In our course EU Law, we had learned some parts 
of the substantive law in the EU, but only touched lightly on the rules concerning the access to social 
benefits in the Union as an example, the recent extension of the scope of free movement of persons. 
Therefore, when we wanted to explore this area in depth, we did it with the prior knowledge we had 
about the general mechanisms of legal development and interpretation of substantive law in the EU, 
but without much substantive knowledge about the rules on social benefits in the EU. The 
development of the rules on social benefit in the EU is not, as we found from our research, taking up 
more than a few pages in even the most extensive books on the substantive EU law. Furthermore, 
much of the important development in the area is so new that almost no legal scholars have analysed 
it yet. Therefore we have had to base much of our project on our own readings and analyses of the 
interpretations and consequences of a long number of important judgements in the area found by the 
use of the relatively few but very precise accounts of the important judgements of legal scholars 
which exists. In order to gain further knowledge in the area we examined the empiric data presented 
below, starting by the empiric data for the legal analysis followed by the empiric data for the 
discussing analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Empirical data for the legal analysis 
2.1.1.1 Primary and secondary law 
We have selected the relevant primary and secondary legislation (appendix 1) by going through the 
chapters on free movement and social policy in the Treaties and the secondary law stemming from 
these chapters. We have likewise looked through the case law in the area to see, which primary and 
secondary legal sources, the ECJ has drawn upon in its judgements. Even though many of the legal 
sources derive from when the EU was still called the EC (European Community), we will refer to all 
the legal sources as parts of EU law for the sake of simplicity.  
 
In the legal analysis of the valid law in the area we include the treaty articles, which we through the 
analysis, find are the most relevant (appendix 1). Apart from the Treaty Articles seen in appendix 1, 
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the relevant articles from Regulation 1612/68 (now 492/11), Regulation 1408/71 (now 883/04) and 
Directive 2004/38 as seen in the same appendix, will also be included in the legal analysis as these 
are the pieces of secondary legislation which have for decades governed EU workers’ and citizens’ 
rights to receive social benefits. Regarding the regulations, we will briefly describe Regulation 
1612/68 and its influence on the rules on welfare benefits, but as it only includes rules regarding this 
in one single article, article 7, we will only include article 7 in our empirical data. We will include 
many more articles from Regulation of the coordination on social security benefits 1408/71 and its 
replacement Regulation 883/04 as it is these Regulations, which have generated a growth in case law 
and recently caused the most controversy between the member states and the EU. Another reason for 
looking into the Regulation of the coordination of social security benefits is that it is the legal basis 
for the present Finnish case, our case study. The other piece of secondary legislation which has 
recently generated a lot of case law expanding the rules in the area is the before mentioned Directive 
2004/38. We will therefore include several articles from that directive in our empirical data for the 
analysis. All the included articles from the secondary legislation are listed in appendix 1.  
 
2.1.1.2 Case law 
The criteria for our selection of cases has been that they should be relevant for understanding the 
development of the ECJ’s interpretation and the development of EU law which has now led the 
Commission to refer Finland to the ECJ and some member states to express the opinion that the rules 
have gone too far. We have identified the relevant case law (appendix 2) by studying the few existing 
assessments of the case law by legal scholars, which has influenced the development of the rules on 
the access to social benefits in the Union. On the basis of these reading, we have been looking 
through around 50 cases which has influenced the area and selected the 17 most relevant to answer 
our problem formulation. These 17 cases we have been analysing the meaning of more in depth and 
included at different points of our legal analysis. In this way we have created a quite comprehensive 
empiric data in relation to our research question. If we had had more time, we could have done our 
own search in InfoCuria, the complete database of case law of the ECJ, to find all the cases that could 
possibly be relevant to understanding the topic of social benefits. In that way we could have 
conducted more independent research by looking through all cases from different searches, which 
could maybe have led us to find more cases relevant for our legal analysis.  
The selection of the recent cases in the two areas we analyse more in depth in the end of our legal 
analysis defining valid law, family benefits and student grants, is based on accounts of the recent 
development found under the theme ‘Free movement and welfare tourism’ at EU-oplysningen (the 
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EU Information Centre) (EU-oplysningen 19.11.2014). The selection of the two cases, Chassart and 
Bergström, on family benefits, is based on a memorandum from the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs pointing to the fact that these two cases have given a new understanding of the rules on the 
aggregation of periods, which is the rule relevant for the Finnish case (EU-oplysningen november 
2013). The selection of the cases on student grants are based on a memorandum from the European 
Committee of the national parliament of Denmark which describes the three recent judgements from 
the ECJ in German and Danish cases affecting the Danish obligation to pay grants to student from 
other EU-countries (Folketinget 02.07.2013).  
 
In analysing the legal development, to answer the first part of our problem formulation, we will only 
be focusing on the development in primary and secondary legislation and the case law of the ECJ. 
Therefore, we will not include the preparatory work for the different legislation, we analyse in the 
legal analysis. A legal analysis of Danish law would be insufficient without including the preparatory 
work, but as the preparatory work has a much smaller impact on the interpretation of EU law, we can 
leave out the preparatory work without disadvantaging our analysis of valid law significantly 
(Nielsen 2008:236). The preparatory could have been a valuable source of information about the 
context of the legislation, the aim of the legislation, and the reasons for the deselection of areas taken 
through the negotiations. It could have been interesting to include the preparatory work in a legal 
analysis, but as the aim of our legal analysis is to define valid law, we have chosen not to include the 
preparatory work. We have instead chosen to focus on the final legislation and the ECJ’s 
interpretations of the rules in the case law as that has a significant impact on the development of law 
in the EU (Nielsen 2008:236). As the objectives of the legislation in the EU legal systems is also 
always included in the preambles of the Treaties and the recitals of the secondary legislation, we will 
still be able to interpret these objectives as part of our legal analysis.  
Additionally, we have chosen not to include the development of soft law in the area of social policy, 
as soft law is voluntary and is therefore not resulting in any enforceable legal obligations (Neergaard 
& Nielsen 2012:111). If we had included soft law, especially the initiatives under the Open Methods 
of Coordination (OMC) of social benefits would have been relevant. Through the OMC, a some 
voluntary regulations have been produced in the past years and have influenced parts of the national 
welfare systems in the member states (Martinsen & Vollard 2014:15). Including such soft law would 
also have given us a broader picture on how the national welfare systems develop alongside the 
binding EU rules in the area, but as one of the problems behind our problem formulation is how the 
member states can disagree with the binding rules they have enacted themselves, we will only include 
primary and secondary law and case law as empirical data for our analysis.   
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2.1.1.3 Case study: the Finnish Case 
As briefly mentioned, the second part of the legal analysis will consist of an analysis of an 
exemplifying case to get a deeper understanding of the practical consequences of  the 
legal  development in the rules on social benefits. This second part of the analysis is thus supposed to 
exemplify “a broader category of which it is a member” (Bryman 2012:70). Our case study will 
therefore entail a detailed analysis of a single case, the present Finnish case on unemployment 
benefits (European Commission: November 2013). Our case study of the Finnish case will not be 
used as a generalisation, but as an exemplifying case (Bryman 2012: 66,67). It will engage in the 
legal analysis of the broader development in the rules on EU citizens’ access to social benefits as an 
example of how a legal conflict can arise today. By analysing this present example of a legal conflict, 
we will be able to examine, in depth, the practical results of the valid law today on the relationship 
between a member state’s national legislation and EU law. It will enable us to understand the 
elements of a conflict creating the political critique, which we will go further into in the discussing 
analysis. The specific analysis of the Finnish case is thus the second part of the legal analysis, but in 
the discussing analysis that follows, the focus will be on the broader political debate concerning 
welfare benefits.  
As the analysis of the Finnish case is more detailed, it will also, apart from building on the empirical 
foundation and knowledge from the first part of the legal analysis, be based on additional, specific 
empirical data. There has still been no judgement in the Finnish case, and therefore the material 
available on the case is limited. We have thus constructed our empirical data of the information that 
we could obtain. The empirical data for the analysis of the Finnish case consists of the relevant 
articles on unemployment benefits in Regulation 1408/71 and 883/04 (appendix 1) and the relevant 
case law on these specific articles (appendix 2), a memo (appendix 7) and a press release (appendix 
5) from the European Commission on the infringement procedure against Finland, an expert 
interview with law professor Jon Kvist (appendix 3), a correspondence with spokesman Jonathan 
Todd from the European Commission (appendix 6), the letter with the Finnish response to the 
reasoned opinion from the Commission (appendix 4), and the relevant articles from Finland’s 
Unemployment Security Act 1290/2002 (appendix 1). 
 
The press release from the Commission on the decision of taking Finland to Court for infringing EU 
law describes the legal conflict between EU law and the national Finnish law. Thus it is on the 
ground of the press release that we have chosen much of the other empirical data; it has showed us 
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which articles from the EU Regulation and the Finnish national legislation was relevant and therefore 
also, which EU case law would be relevant to look into.  
To find these cases, we conducted database research on the case law on the specific rules in Article 
61 in Regulation 1408/71 and Article 67 in Regulation 883/04 in the TRess database containing both 
the old and the new regulation and all existing case law for the articles (TRess: 09.10.2014). The 
reason for choosing this specific search is that Finland is brought to Court for infringing on article 67 
in Regulation 883/04. Thus, we have included an overview of the case law on that article in our 
analysis of the present Finnish case to understand if and whether it affects the present case. We have 
read through all the cases (appendix 2) and included in the analysis the judgements we found relevant 
for understanding the legal background for the ongoing Finnish case.  
 
As the impact of the newest cases in other areas of the rules on social benefits can also be relevant for 
the present Finnish case, and as they have not yet fully been analysed by legal scholars, we conducted 
an expert interview with Jon Kvist, professor in European Public Policies and Welfare Studies at 
Roskilde University (appendix 3).  Through his research, Jon Kvist has obtained a broad and deep 
understanding of the interplay between politics and the development of law in the EU, and his 
assessment of the recent development in the area will be used alongside our own analysis in 
describing the different possible outcomes of the Finnish case. The views of Jon Kvist are included in 
our empirical data because it can contribute to making our assessment of the impact of the valid law 
on the possible outcomes in the Finnish case more valid. Of course, we do not intend to use his nor 
our own estimations to conclude definitively what the result of the judgement in the case will be. 
Even an approximate conclusion of that kind would require interviews with more professors in law 
and public policies and a combination of their evaluations of the most possible outcome. Thus, we 
will only try to outline the possible outcomes and discuss briefly their probability, with help from the 
views of Jon Kvist. 
 
We conducted a correspondence with Jonathan Todd, spokesman for the European employment 
commissioner, László Andor, because he was the contact person on the press release from the 
Commission. We asked if there were any more documents available on the Finnish case than what we 
could find. Jonathan Todd gave us more precise information on how far the case has gotten in the EU 
legal system, and that information must be seen as very valid, as the spokesman is working in the 
department in the Commission processing the infringement procedure against Finland. This 
information is used in the analysis to describe the status of the Finnish case.  
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We came in in contact with the Finnish answer to the Commission’s reasoned opinion (Appendix 4) 
by contacting Mr. Juhana Tuomola, who is an EU Information Officer in the Finnish Government. 
The Finnish answer to the reasoned opinion is not yet translated and available to the public, it is 
written in Finnish, a language we are not familiar with. We have nevertheless chosen to use the letter 
as empirical data for the analysis as it is the only source available to understand the Finnish 
arguments for not complying with EU law. We have translated the answer by the use of Google’s 
translation service. Therefore, we have chosen not to use quotes from the reasoned opinion, because 
translation mistakes could appear, but instead we refer the Finnish argumentation. Even though this 
empirical data is less precise because it is in Finnish, we see it as quite valid as long as we only use 
the main arguments and not analyse every single word, as it is an official document from the Finnish 
authorities dealing with this specific case.  
 
2.1.2 Empirical data for the discussing analysis 
As our politological discussing analysis is focusing on describing theoretically the situation of the 
member states (Chapter 6) and discussing their possibilities (Chapter 7), it is less empirical than the 
legal analysis. 
 
 In describing theoretically the legal development’s consequence for the member states (Section 7.1 
& 7.2), we use as empirical data the results from our legal analysis alongside with our theorists’ 
accounts of the member states’ and the institutions’ different positions in the discussions on the 
changes of Regulation 1408/71 and in the recent negotiations on Regulation 883/04 (Martinsen 
2013). We will also include the most relevant preparatory work for the new Regulation 883/04, 
which is accessible through the EUR-Lex database (EUR-Lex: Procedure: 27.10.2014 & EUR-Lex: 
Procedure: 30.10.2014). In our discussion of the member states’ possibilities for changing the 
development of law in the area on social security (Chapter 7), we will use the same empirical data as 
for the first part alongside with the treaty articles laying down the decision rules for the relevant 
legislation (appendix 1) and two letters recently sent to the EU Chairmanship by two different groups 
of member states, expressing their opinion in the debate on welfare tourism (Council of the European 
Union: 31.05.2013 & Council of the European Union 04.12.2013). This empirical data provides a 
picture of the development of the most recent negotiations on the legislation on the rules on social 
benefits and makes clear the degree of agreement or disagreement between the different member 
states and institutions in these negotiations. At the same time, the Treaty Articles containing the 
decision rules makes us able to consider in our discussing analysis which procedures the member 
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states can follow if they wish to change the different legislations. If we were to focus our project 
more on the political possibilities and the degree of agreement or disagreement among the member 
states, we could for example have conducted political interviews with representatives from the 
member states and the parliament. We could also have gone through all the minutes of the debates in 
the Council and in the EP on social policy in the past years to be able to map precisely the 
preferences of each member state and each political group in the EP. That would have given us a 
better empirical foundation for discussing the member states and the EP’s present positions in the 
debate on social benefits in the EU, but it is left out because of our choice of focus in the discussing 
analysis on the member states’ legal and political possibilities for changing the development in the 
rules. As the purpose of our discussing analysis is not to give a complete account of all member 
states’ different preferences in the area and how they could affect future negotiations, but rather to 
define and discuss their different possibilities and the likelihood of these possibilities becoming 
reality on an overall level, we see the selected empirical data as the most relevant to provide this 
overview. 
 
2.2 Selection of theory  
In our problem area it becomes clear that some of the member states think that the development of 
the EU law has gone too far concerning social benefits. When we looked deeper into the topic, we 
found out that it is especially the ECJ’s judgements which have widened the scope of the law in the 
area. Therefore we wanted to use theorists, who can explain how it has been possible for the ECJ to 
develop the rules to that extent, and what the consequences the development has had for the members 
states’ control over the law.  
 
The first of our two sets of theory, the legal theory, builds on existing knowledge from the course EU 
Law. In the course we had been through the overall procedural and substantive law, the principles of 
the direct and indirect effect of EU law, the supremacy of the EU law and how EU law can be 
enforced. We have chosen not to specify the basic knowledge of the familiarisation course on EU 
law, and instead used Ruth Nielsen’s theory of EU as a multilayered system to give us a theoretical 
framework for examining the EU legal system. In the EU Law course we have learned cursorily 
about how the ECJ interprets, but not paid considerable attention to how the ECJ’s interpretations can 
expand the scope of EU law. We have therefore also chosen to include Professor of Private Law and 
European Economic Law at the University of Bremen, Norbert Reich’s, theory on, how the ECJ 
interprets teleologically. Reich provides us with concepts to explain how the ECJ applies the 
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principles found at the different levels of the EU law in its judgements in specific cases and how it 
interprets the main rules and exceptions in EU law. 
 
The second set of theory, the politological theory, shall provide us with the tools to discuss the legal 
and political challenges for the member states and to understand which possibilities the member 
states have to circumvent the ECJ’s judgements, if they wish to. We have chosen to use Dorthe 
Martinsen, Gerda Falkner, and Karen Alter, because they all focus on the member states’ situations 
when the ECJ widens the rules in an area of EU law. The three theorists all acknowledge the 
objectivity of the ECJ, to a certain extent, but at the same time they indicate that the ECJ exercises 
some sort of political power in the way it interprets the EU law in its judgements. Falkner and 
Martinsen’s (2011) theory on court decision traps will give us a theoretical understanding of the 
narrow political and legal situation the member states can end up in, when the ECJ expands EU law 
in its judgements and what possibilities the member states have to exit it. Alter’s (1998) concepts on 
how politicians and the court work differently with developing law provides us with arguments to the 
discussion of the member states’ political situation today. It can be seen as a critique of Alter that her 
theory is very general and that she does not relate her concepts directly to the balance between the 
member states and the ECJ in relation to the rules on social benefits. On the other hand, Falkner and 
Martinsen’s theory specifically include areas on social policy, which makes it even more applicable 
in our discussion of the member state presents situation in this area. 
 
On the other hand, if we had looked deeper into the member states and the other institutions’ 
preferences in the discussions on social policy, other theory would have been relevant and interesting 
to include in the discussing analysis. This we could for example have done by for example by 
including political theory on, how political preferences are established or theory about the power 
balance between the EU institutions and the EU politicians.  
 
2.3.1 The theorists’ perceptions of law 
The chosen theorists described above all have a pragmatic understanding of law, which include 
elements from both constructivism and the empirical disciplines as realism. Their pragmatic 
understanding of law therefore comes to define how law is perceived and understood in the project.   
 
The theorists’ realist understanding of law is seen when they acknowledge that the ECJ has a 
practical institutional reality to follow when making its judgements. The ECJ’s interpretation is 
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therefore determined by the practical reality; its institutional role and the politically negotiated 
legislation it can refer to.  
The constructivist elements is seen in especially the politological theorist’s emphasis on the fact that 
the ECJ can choose itself which legal sources and principles to refer to in its judgements. The 
theorists all include an understanding of how the ECJ this way can set its own agenda and create 
different realities depending on which general norms it chooses to apply at the expense of others. It is 
this understanding of the law which supports our choice of looking into the case law of the ECJ to 
find out which general norms and principles it uses the most and how it justifies for its choices.  
 
For this reason we use the concept of legal doctrine to explain, the scientifically approach of the 
theorists. The legal doctrine is basically studying law as a normative system limiting its ‘empirical 
data’ to legal texts and court decisions (Van Hoecke 2011:2). It is mainly about the interpretation of 
law, and how law is balancing with other laws or legal principles (Van Hoecke 2011:7). Legal 
doctrine consists of various methods, and has therefore been practiced and conceived in many ways 
(Van Hoecke 2011:3). With our choice of theorist, only parts of the method of the legal doctrine will 
be underlying the project. We will therefore not go in depth with all parts of the method.  
 
According to the method of legal doctrine, legal texts will always be interpreted differently, and there 
does not exist an uniform way to interpret the legal texts. Also, legal doctrine claims that 
interpretation and argumentation can not be separated from each other, because: “Interpretations are 
underpinned with arguments and these arguments may partly refer to an ‘objective’ reality. To this 
extent the correctness of arguments may be checked empirically. However, most arguments in legal 
reasoning are not ’true’ or ‘false’ but more or less convincing. They do not qualify for an empirical 
verification” (Van Hoecke 2011:3,7). The theorists do believe that the ECJ does not choose its legal 
argumentation to be arbitrary. This is the reason why we see the EU law as a kind of construction. 
The ECJ looks at the law in a certain way, and choose itself which principles it wants to judge on 
behalf of. It is not to say that the ECJ is normative, but it makes some legal constructions. This way it 
creates changes in valid EU law and can therefore to a certain degree be seen as political.  
 
Despite the constructivist view, the theorists are also positivist to a certain degree, because  
the interpretation is more important than the logic of the law (Van Hoecke 2011:9) There exists quite 
a lot of criticism of legal doctrine. The criticism is that legal doctrine is too descriptive, without 
taking the context of the law sufficiently into account (Van Hoecke  2011:3)  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical understanding of the ECJ’s role in developing 
EU law  
In this chapter we will present the legal theory, which will constitute the theoretical basis for our 
legal analysis. We will first present a theoretical understanding of the role of the ECJ and the 
principles developed in EU law. Afterwards we will explain the notion of ‘teleological interpretation’ 
and how it is used by the ECJ and in closing we will describe how we apply the theoretical concepts 
to our legal analysis.  
The role of the European Court of Justice in the EU legal system is laid down in Article 19(1) TEU 
and is “to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties”. 
Apart from the formal role, the ECJ has itself developed a range of legal principles including 
procedures to review the member states’ compliance with EU law, the supremacy of EU law and it’s 
direct and indirect effect and general principles for the application of EU law. These and all the other 
established principles underlie every legal analysis of EU law and therefore also ours. To produce a 
theoretical framework for the problems relevant for answering our problem formulation, the 
following theoretical chapters will focus on the next level: how much room for manoeuvre the ECJ 
has in its interpretation and application of the treaties.  
 
3.1. The ECJ’s role in a multi-layered EU legal order 
Ruth Nielsen, professor in EU law at the Copenhagen Business School, has been concerned with 
describing a common European legal method.  She has arrived at the understanding that the 
embedded nature of EU law and national law is becoming more intense (Nielsen 2012:7). 
 
Ruth Nielsen argues that the EU should be seen as a multi-layered, interactive legal system 
compounded of both elements from national legislation in the different member states, EU law and 
international law which should all be seen as possible subsystems (Nielsen 2012:113). Nielsen argues 
that a change in the way the EU law system is to be seen, is for the most part, caused by a shift in the 
way the ECJ applies and develops EU law (Nielsen 2012:92). In the first decades of the EU’s 
existence, the ECJ seemed to look at the relationship between elements from national law and 
elements from EU law as hierarchical and emphasised the supremacy and direct effect of EU law. 
Nielsen calls that way of understanding the relationship the ‘27-model’ whereas she means that now 
the ECJ seems to be applying a ‘one-big-system model’ (Nielsen 2012:93). She underlines that the 
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ECJ today applies a more horizontal and interactive approach to the relationship between the national 
and the EU level of law. One sign of the change is that the ECJ has taken a new approach in cases 
where national law elements are incompatible with EU law: national courts must leave inapplicable 
the element of the national law that conflicts with EU law and the national legislative power must 
accept it too. Thereby, the national courts and national governments at all levels are required to 
collaborate on making the EU and national systems effective.  
 
One of Nielsen’s points is also that if one sees the EU legal order as one big system, opposition 
against the ECJ’s use of the general principles of the Union in its judgements in specific cases can be 
seen as signs of what is accepted in the national legal systems, which are also, as subsystems, parts of 
the EU legal order in this model. This is an important understanding of the interplay between the 
national layer and the EU layer in developing EU law and this concept will be part of our conceptual 
framework for the analysis as we will also in our study of recent cases and the present Finnish case 
interpret the opposition of one or more member states against the impact of the application of a 
general principle from the ECJ. These kinds of conflicts also have to do with the form of 
interpretation the ECJ uses and the limits to it which will therefore be drawn upon theoretically in the 
following chapter. 
 
3.2. The ECJ’s interpretation of EU law  
According to Norbert Reich et al, the legal system in the EU is build up quite differently from the 
legal systems of the member states, and has it’s own criteria for interpretation of the law (Reich 
2005:25). While the national courts of the member states have mainly been interpreting law 
historically, which means on grounds of not only the law texts, but also the preparatory work, official 
documents behind them and precedence formed by former judgements, the ECJ has been hostile to 
this form of interpretation. That is due to the differences in the national legal systems in the member 
states, Reich argues, that the use of historical interpretation from the ECJ would undermine the unity 
of EU law. Reich argues that the ECJ has been insisting on using autonomous interpretation, to 
ensure that the rules in the EU law creates the same rights and obligations through the Union (Reich 
2005:27). The autonomous interpretation has for the ECJ meant interpretation irrespective of both 
legal traditions in the national legal systems and the other EU institutions’ understanding of the law 
laid down in the preparatory work. 
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In ensuring the uniformity of Union Law, the ECJ has therefore often been interpreting teleologically 
by specifying the general norms in the treaties (Reich 2005:25). In its teleological interpretation, it 
has been referring to the general principles preambles of the Treaties and the recitals of secondary 
law  (Reich 2005:27). The interpretation consists of linking a specific rule in a certain area of EU law 
with a broader EU law principle, e.g. free movement of workers (Reich 2005:31). In its 
interpretation, the ECJ both interprets existing rules and applies broader principles when judging in 
specific cases. In its judgement in the CILFIT case from 1982 (C-283/81), the ECJ clarified the way 
in which it interprets EU law in and established the principle of acte clair: If the interpretation of the 
primary and secondary legislation for a certain matter is clear - acte claire - then there will be no need 
for further interpretation by ECJ (Reich 2005:26). But if not, the ECJ will be judging on the matter, 
and it’s interpretation of the law will be valid law and bind all the member states. In its judgement in 
the CILFIT case, the ECJ explained its teleological interpretation as following:  
“Finally, every provision of [EU] law must be placed in it’s context and interpreted in the light of the 
[EU] law as a whole, regard being has to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the 
date in which the provisions in question is being applied” (CILFIT, para 20) 
 
The quote underlines that, secondary law must be interpreted in the light of primary law and the 
interpretation of all EU law must be interpreted in line with the objectives of the Union. Therefore, in 
the ECJ’s teleological interpretation, the fundamental freedoms of the treaties must be respected. Of 
course there are limits to the application of the fundamental freedoms, which are spelled out in the 
legislation or by case law, but according to the ECJ, the limits shall be interpreted narrowly (Reich 
2005: 30). Ruth Nielsen argues that these limits are controlled by the usual justification test for 
restrictions on the four freedoms which requires a restriction to pursue a legitimate aim, be necessary 
and be applied by legitimate means to be accepted (Neergaard & Nielsen 2012:96). 
 
In this way, according to Reich, the ECJ has created a system in the way in which it interprets the 
numerous rules and principles; the general principles and the four freedoms of EU law are interpreted 
broadly, while the limitations to them are interpreted narrowly. Former Advocat General of the ECJ, 
Nial Fenelly, who has also been engaged in conceptualising the ECJ’s teleological interpretation, 
argues that, as the ECJ does not look at law as ‘plain words’, one has to look at it’s definition of 
context and purpose in its judgement in the area one is investigating to be able to understand the 
ECJ’s use of the different principles in that an area (Fenelly 1996:665). 
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3.3. Use of the theoretical concepts in the legal analysis 
The above mentioned theory will constitute the theoretical basis for our legal analysis of the 
development in the area of social benefit. We will be applying Nielsen’s understanding of the EU 
legal system as ‘one big system’. Therefore, when analysing and interpreting valid law, we will see 
the interplay between EU law and national law as interactive and thus focus on the changing 
understanding of the rules, and it’s impact on national rules in the area and their applicability. As this 
interactive relationship between EU and national law according to Neergaard contributes to the 
development of EU law, we will focus on the ECJ’s judgements and interpretations of cases in the 
development.  
 
With Reich’s understanding of the ECJ’s interpretation as a point of departure we will, in our legal 
analysis, conduct a legal dogmatic interpretation narrowing down what is valid law for EU nationals’ 
right to social benefits in other EU member states than their own. In our legal analysis, we will, to 
gain an understanding of the result of the teleological interpretation of the ECJ, focus on discovering 
which general, fundamental principles the ECJ focuses on in the specific area of social benefits. As 
Reich points out that the ECJ in its teleological interpretation often interprets the main rules in the 
EU legislation very broadly and the exceptions very narrowly, we will in our legal analysis focus on 
identifying how the main principles and the exceptions have been interpreted through time by the 
ECJ and how their scope and the balance between them can be seen today. This will make us able to 
define what is valid law is in the area. In this context, we also focus on analysing how the usual 
justification test, as Ruth Nielsen describes, for restrictions on the free movement has been 
interpreted and applied by the ECJ in regard to restrictions on the free movement of persons because 
of considerations related to national social security systems or rules.      
 
In the first part of our legal analysis, we will narrow down the relevant legislation on social benefits 
by going through the legal development in the area. In the second part of our legal analysis we will 
move to a more specific and detailed level and analyze and interpret the specific law provisions and 
case law for the present Finnish case to be able to describe the legal conflict and outline which 
judgments the ECJ can end up giving in the case.  
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Chapter 4: Legal analysis 
4.1. The development of coordination of social benefits in EU law and case law 
The coordination of social security has been part of EU law since the Treaty of Rome from 1958, 
when it was found necessary to adopt social security measures to remove obstacles to the free 
movement of persons between the member states. In the 1950’s some regions of Europe experienced 
high unemployment and others lacked labour force, so the aim of the rules were to make the work 
force able to move freely within the Union. The first legislation was very simple, so it was first when 
Regulation 1612/68 and Regulation 1408/71 were adopted that the rules became practically relevant.  
 
The EU and the member states can adopt secondary legislation on social benefits because the they 
have shared competence in the area of the internal market (Article 4 TFEU), which the free 
movement of workers is part of - and the secondary legislation on social benefits have their legal 
basis in the title IV on the free movement of persons, services and capital, Chapter 1 on workers.  
 
Regulation 1612/68, which purpose is to institutionalise the free movement of workers, was the first 
regulation to touch upon social benefits. It has its legal basis in Article 49 TEEC (now Article 46 
TFEU), which provides that the legislators shall “issue directives or make regulations setting out the 
measures required to bring about freedom of movement for workers”. Regulation 1612/68 set up 
principles for the equal treatment of workers, also in the social area. The relevant article according to 
social benefits is Article 7, which lays down the principle that a worker who is a national of a 
member state in the territory of another member state “shall enjoy the same social and tax 
advantages as national workers”. It thereby lays down rules for the equal treatment in ‘social 
advantages’ between migrant workers and national workers. ‘Social advantages’ shall be understood 
to cover all those advantages, which, whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are 
generally granted to national workers because of their objective status as workers (Damjanovic et De 
Witte 2009:61).  
 
Article 42 TEC (now Article 48 TEU) provides that the European Parliament and the Council shall 
adopt measures in the field of social security necessary to provide the freedom of workers and make 
arrangements to secure: “(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to 
benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of 
the several countries. (b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of member states” 
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for employed and self-employed migrant workers and their dependants.  That is what Regulation 
1408/71 did with legal basis in Article 42 TEC (now Article 48 TFEU). The main goal of the 
regulation is to secure free movement of persons across borders (1408/71 Art. 14. Now 883/2004. 
Art. 13), which is done by removing hindrances and obstacles for the free movement (Poulsen 
2011:124). Regulation 1408/71 does not harmonize social security benefits at the EU level or 
determine fixed standards. Rules on taxes and social security fall within the member states’ exclusive 
competence (Article 2 TEU), so Regulation 1408/71 leaves it up to the member states to design their 
social security systems with each their benefits, and likewise leaves it up to the member states to 
decide the calculation rules for their own benefits. What the Regulation does then is set up principles 
for the coordination of the benefits (Greer & Sokol 2013:63.) Thus, it coordinates social security 
benefits, in a way that ensures that workers working in another member state than their own are not 
discriminated against. 
 
While Article 7 in Regulation 1612/68 covers social advantages, Regulation 1408/71 covers social 
security benefits, understood as benefits calculated on grounds of work, insurance, or residency. It 
does not cover social assistance which has a more unclear definition, but is broadly understood as 
benefits which are discretionary and intended to cover general needs as the risk of poverty by 
ensuring a minimum income for everyone (Jorens et al 2013:18). The social security benefits covered 
of Regulation 1408/71 are listed in Article 4: 
 
“(a) sickness and maternity benefits; 
(b) invalidity benefits, including those intended for the maintenance or improvement of earning 
capacity; 
(c) old-age benefits; 
(d) survivors' benefits; 
(e) benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases; 
(f) death grants; 
(g) unemployment benefits; 
(h) family benefits.” 
 
Regulation 1408/71 contains four general principles for the coordination of the social security 
benefits listed above: Equal treatment, aggregation of periods, prevention of overlapping of benefits, 
and exportability (European Parliament: Social security cover in other EU Member States 
12.09.2014).  
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The first principle is that there shall be equal treatment of workers from other member states and 
national workers (1408/71 i.a. Article 3). Article 3 states that “persons resident in the territory of one 
of the Member States to whom this Regulation applies shall be subject to the same obligations and 
enjoy the same benefits under the legislation of any Member State as the nationals of that State.” The 
meaning of the principle is that workers from other member states shall be given the same rights as 
the host state’s own nationals, including retention of rights and the same rules on aggregation. 
The second general principle, the principle of aggregation, (1408/71 i.a. Art. 9, 10) means that the 
competent member state must take into account “to the extent necessary, periods of insurance, 
employment or self-employment completed in any other member states as though they were periods of 
insurance completed under the legislation which it administers” (1408/71, i.e., Art. 72). By requiring 
the member states’ authorities to include periods completed in another member states than their own 
when calculating the right for social security benefits for an immigrant worker, this principle seeks to 
avoid discrimination against workers who have worked in another member state than their own 
(Poulsen 2011:124).  
 
Regulation 1408/71 was not replaced until 2010, and Regulation 1612/68 not until 2011, but in the 
decades in between the ECJ's case law has come to define (and redefine) the balance between these 
coordinating EU rules and the member states’ self-determination over their welfare 
budgets  (Damjanovic et De Witte 2009:61).  
 
4.2 Case Law and its impact on social benefits 
From early on, the ECJ took a broad approach to the provisions on the right to and coordination of 
social benefits and extended both the personal and substantive scope of the main principles 
(Damjanovic et De Witte 2009:61).  
 
In expanding the personal scope, the ECJ has been interpreting the term worker in a very broad sense 
as being practically any economically active person (Damjanovic et De Witte 2009:62). Recently the 
case Vatsouras from 2009 showed that even very little economic activity can grant an EU national the 
status of a worker. In the case of Mr. Vatsouras, who had only had a “brief minor” professional 
activity, the ECJ held that very little professional activity could not ensure him “for a livelihood”, but 
would still grant him the status and rights of a worker (case c-22/08). The ECJ’s argument was that as 
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long as Mr. Vatsouras has been working, he cannot be denied the rights of a worker in relation to 
social benefits.  
 
The personal scope has in that way been expanded i.a. by the ECJ’s emphasis on the equal treatment 
of workers, and with reference to the equal treatment, the ECJ has also expanded workers’ rights to 
social security benefits by ruling in cases concerning discrimination (Damjanovic et De Witte 
2009:62). In the early years, the ECJ ruled mostly in cases concerning direct discrimination, but as 
direct discrimination is clear to detect and prohibit after the principle of equal treatment in both 
Regulations, most later cases has dealt with indirect discrimination. The indirect discrimination often 
concern rules requiring a period of residence or service in the host state before being granted a 
benefit (Barnard 2013:280).  
An example is the Scholz case from 1994 (C-419/92), concerning a German applicant for a job in the 
public service at an Italian selection board. The Italian selection board refused to take into account 
the applicant’s previous employment in Germany when calculating her working experience. This is in 
contradiction with the general principle of aggregation as laid down in Regulation 1408/71. With a 
reference to Article 48(4) EEC (now 45 TFEU) the ECJ ruled that it was indirect discrimination. If 
further made it clear that Article 48 EEC applies to “Any Community national who, irrespective of his 
place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers 
and who has been employed in another member state” (Case C-419/92). A newer example related to 
equal treatment is the case Collins from 2004 (C-138/02). In Collins the UK denied Mr. Collins, an 
Irish-American national, a social security benefit because he was not ‘habitually resident’ in the UK. 
Mr. Collins had been living abroad for years, but had now moved back to the EU. One month after 
his arrival, he applied for jobseeker’s allowance. The ECJ similarly ruled on the basis of article 45 
TFEU on the free movement of workers that it is indirect discrimination to make the entitlement to 
jobseeker’s allowance dependent on being habitually resident in the country. It stated that it must not 
be a disadvantage that you have exercised your right of free movement (Barnard 2013:195). The ECJ 
even stated in the Collins case that “it is no longer possible to exclude from the scope of article 39(2) 
EC [now 45(2) TFEU] (...) a benefit of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment 
in the labor market of a member state”. Even though the judgements of the ECJ are not made with 
direct reference to articles in Regulation 1408/71, the judgments have also influenced and expanded 
the substantive scope of the rules on worker’s rights to social benefits and have shown the width of 
the main rule of equal treatment, which is also a part of the Regulation. The ECJ’s judgments in both 
these cases have made it clear that the principle of non-discrimination of workers who have worked 
in another member state in many situations outweigh national considerations. Furthermore the cases 
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are clear examples of the ECJ’s teleological interpretation, as it draws upon the general principle of 
equal treatment in the Treaties to judge in specific cases. It shows how much emphasis the ECJ 
attaches to the treaty based main rule of equal treatments in its interpretation of the rules on social 
benefits.  
Yet, the ECJ has also in its judgments been justifying some restrictions to the main rule of equal 
treatment in forms of additional requirements disadvantaging workers who have worked in another 
member state. The ECJ has been willing to justify restriction in cases, where the member states’ way 
of ensuring a ‘genuine link’ between the applicant and the member state was legitimate (i.a. case 
Collins C-138/02, Geven C-213/05, Hendrix C-287/05). So was the case, for example with the British 
national rules in the aforementioned Collins case. The rules were justified even though it was indirect 
discrimination, because it was proportionate and contributed to ensure that there was a genuine link. 
The case is an example of how certain exceptions to the main principles can be accepted, as long as 
they pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate. Also very recent examples of restrictions to the 
rule of equal treatment have been seen, and we will return to the current case law, which has also to a 
greater extend concerned the principle on the aggregation of periods, after having analysed the 
influence of the citizenship articles on the development of the rules on social benefits.  
 
4.3 The influence of the citizenship articles and Directive 2004/38 
Apart from the two regulations, the introduction of the citizenship articles with the Maastrict Treaty 
has also had an impact on the application of the rules on social benefits. With the citizenship articles 
all nationals of the EU member states were given the right to move and reside freely in the EU 
territory under the rights and obligations of the Treaties (Article 20 TFEU). The introduction of the 
Citizenship Directive 2004/38 marked a changed view on free movement of workers, because the 
understanding of who should have the right to move freely within the union had changed through the 
legal and political development. With the introduction of the citizenship, also non-economically 
active persons gained rights they did not have before through their status as EU citizens. Therefore, 
some of the rights to social benefits were no longer only for migrant workers and self-employed, non-
economically active migrant citizens were now also entitled (Barnard 2013: 273,467). This is also 
due to the fact that social assistance benefits, which do not fall within scope of Regulation 1408/71, 
were covered by the Citizenship Directive. Therefore the scope of persons entitled to receive social 
benefits increased with the introduction of the directive as ... 
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Directive 2004/38 gives all EU nationals the right to entry any EU member state. The rights that EU 
citizens have when residing in another member state are divided into three categories. The first three 
months an EU national can stay no matter what the motive is, but the host state is not obliged to grant 
any social assistance (Article 24). From three months to five years EU nationals can stay if they are 
workers, self-employed or have enough resources for themselves not to become a burden on the 
social assistance system. In this period they are not granted the right to social assistance (Article 7). 
When an EU national has stayed in a host state for five years, he or she acquires the right of 
permanent residence and can enjoy the same rights as nationals of the member state, also in regard to 
social assistance and even though they do not have sufficient resources or sickness insurance (Article 
16). 
 
However, the wording of the directive regarding citizen’s rights to social assistance is very 
ambiguous (Minderhoud 2009: 222). On the one hand the directive only makes it possible for citizens 
to move freely if they have sufficient resources (Article 14 (1,2)) and on the other hand it underlines 
that an inactive person applying for social assistance will not automatically be expelled (Art. 14(3)). 
The same is the case regarding equal treatment where Article 24 of the directive provides that EU 
citizens should enjoy equal treatment with nationals, but at the same time that they cannot be entitled 
to social assistance in the first three months. As the case law has shown, the ambiguous text in the 
citizenship directive has resulted in rules open for interpretation by the ECJ. The more unclear a rule 
is, the greater freedom does the ECJ have in its interpretation and it has been seen in the ECJ’s 
interpretation of the directive’s rules in its judgements.  
 
The right to equal treatment and not to be discriminated on grounds of nationality, has been 
interpreted broadly by the ECJ and has therefore come to include both direct and indirect 
discrimination and residence criteria (Neergaard et al. 2010:145), as we saw earlier in the 
development in the case law for workers. The right to equal treatment is now also enjoyed by any 
Union citizen moving or intending to move. Cases on the citizenship article has allowed for the ECJ 
to refine the principle that the member states must not penalize their citizens for having taken 
advantage of their right to free movement (Neergaard et al. 2010:146). Practically the situation has 
therefore become that the member states have to justify any territorial requirement, because linking 
the entitlement to a benefit to residence will discourage the citizen from moving to another member 
state, and that has given Union citizens rights to social assistance in many situations (Neergaard et al. 
2010:146). However, as under the rules of the two regulations mentioned earlier, Regulation 1408/71 
and 1612/68, the ECJ has held that member states can legitimately justify a link, if it is non-
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discriminatory and proportionate. That point was lately confirmed by the ECJ’s judgement in the 
aforementioned case Vatsouras from 2009 (case c-22/08). In its judgement the ECJ both refer to 
Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 2004/38. In the judgement it underlined that as long as it is non-
discriminative, a member state can legitimately make the grant of a social assistance like jobseekers 
allowance conditional upon a genuine link between the applicant, the labour market and the member 
state (case c-22/08). Only a few years ago for example habitual residence tests and right to reside 
tests, as in the UK and Ireland, was still accepted by the ECJ as a way of excluding inactive citizens 
(Minderhound 2009: 237). The ECJ still seems to justify rules ensuring ‘a sufficient degree of 
integration’, but not if they are based on a restrictive residence requirement (Neergaard et al 2010: 
146).  
 
Newer cases have caused some problems between some member states’ national legislation and EU 
law regarding the question of when a link can be justified as legitimate. An example, and maybe one 
of the most controversial of them, has been the many conflicts on student grants. Student grants are 
social assistance and not social security benefits, and they are therefore not included in Regulation 
1408/71. Instead they are applicable in the means of Article 21(1) TFEU and Directive 2004/38 
establishing the right to equal treatment for EU citizens with the nationals of the member state in 
which they reside. On this background the ECJ has ruled that students studying in another member 
states can claim equal treatment, i.a. Bidar C-209/03 and Grzelczyk C-184/99. The arguments from 
the ECJ in these cases have been linked to the need for solidarity, but also generally that the citizens’ 
right to equal treatment apply to all citizens residing lawfully in another member state, even though 
they are not economically active. Recent cases have extended the personal scope further. In a case 
from Luxembourg from June 2013 a residence requirement in the country’s legislation for granting 
loans to students was found in breach of the principle of equal treatment (Gierch C-20/12). Likewise, 
the judgment in a Danish case from February 2013 stated that Danish student grant shall be granted 
to citizens if they have exercised their right of free movement and worked in the respective country 
(Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelse og Uddannelsesstøtte C-46/12). The reason why the students 
should be granted student grant is therefore, according to the ECJ, not in means of their title as 
student (Article 12 Directive 2004/38), but as their title as worker (Article 24 Directive 2004/38). 
Especially the ensuing judgement in the joint cases C-523/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover and 
Philipp Seeberger v Studentenwerk Heidelberg have limited the ways in which a member state can 
legitimately justify an additional link for granting social assistance to EU citizens. Both cases were 
concerned with the justification of additional requirements on the grant of student grants. In the two 
cases referred by preliminary rulings from two German courts, the ECJ ruled that the German 
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requirement of three years of uninterrupted residence in Germany for granting more than one year of 
study grant to student studying in another member state was contrary to the freedom of movement for 
citizens of the European Union (Court of Justice of the European Union, 18.07.2013). The cases 
involved German nationals who had been living in Germany for a part of their lives, but also lived in 
Spain and Tunisia with their respective families. They were therefore refused a student grant for more 
than a year of their studies. The ECJ made the judgement on basis of the principle of the free 
movement of citizens. It concluded that the German requirement was an unjustified restriction on the 
right to move and reside freely. It stated that the German rule was likely to discourage home state 
nationals to exercise their right of free movement and reside in another country (Ibid.). The German 
counter argument was that it is necessary to ensure that full benefit is only paid to citizens with a 
sufficient degree of integration into the German society. The objective of ensuring sufficient 
integration was generally accepted by the ECJ while it ruled that the specific German requirement 
was too general and exclusive to achieve that objective. The German requirement was therefore 
judged as disproportionate and could not be justified. 
 
Thus, the result of the citizenship articles has been that the main rule is that EU nationals lawfully 
residing in another member state cannot be denied equal treatment with nationals of that member 
state in regard to social assistance, but that restrictions can be justified, if the aim of them is 
legitimate, for example ensuring a certain level of integration. 
 
The rules in the Directive 2004/38 are still quite new and there is a difference of opinion among legal 
scholars on how much the right to social assistance for EU citizens can be expanded on basis of this 
Directive and the main principle of equal treatment. However, apart from the limitations to the links 
that member states can require from citizens from other member states, many of the legal scholars 
seem doubtful about the effectiveness on the restriction whereby the member states can expel citizens 
who are a ‘reasonable burdens’ because it can be difficult to prove that they are (Minderhound 
2009:237). As an example, Martinsen (2007) points to the fact that the ECJ in its case law has refused 
that seeking recourse in itself is a sufficient reason for a member state for declaring a citizen from 
another member state an unreasonable burden.  
 
As seen in the analysis of the impact of the citizenship articles and the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 
on EU national rights to social assistance, the ECJ has widened both the substantive and personal 
scope with its judgements. The arguments mainly refer to the free movement of workers and the main 
principle of the Directive, namely equal treatments. The extension of the rights to social benefits and 
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principles arising from the citizenship articles might pressure and influence the interpretation of the 
other aforementioned rules in the area as well. 
Therefore one may assume that the ECJ’s narrow interpretation of the member states right to require 
an additional link, before EU nationals from other member states can receive social assistance, will 
also influence the interpretation of the restrictions of the principles of Regulation 1408/71 and 
Regulation 1612/68. Later in the analysis, we will look into two new cases, Chassart C-257/10 and 
Bergström C-619/11 to analyse to what extend the ECJ has justified additional links in the member 
states’ national legislation during the recent years (section 4.5).  
 
4.4 Regulation 883/2004 - the replacement of Regulation 1408/71 
Before we examine the newer case law on social security, we will look into the changes in the rules 
of the new Regulation 883/04 compared to 1408/71, which it replaces. The new regulation includes 
in the changes that the development in the understanding of the rules which the ECJ’s case law has 
caused since 1408/71 entered into force, and we will examine which and how the relevant rules have 
change to understand the basis on which cases are judged today. The new Regulation includes the 
amendments and case law that have changed the scope of the rules in Regulation 1408/71 since it 
entered into force.  
 
One of the biggest changes regarding the coordination of social security schemes is the personal 
scope of the Regulation. The scope has been widened in Regulation 883/2004 and now covers EU-
Citizens and their dependents (article 2 883/2004), while the personal scope in the original 
Regulation 1408/71 was narrowed down to employed persons and their families. This means that 
more people are covered by the regulation, as the citizenship article covers all EU-citizens, not just 
economically active persons. It is seen even clearer in the recitals of the two Regulations. In 
Regulation 1408/71 the personal scope is explained as "workers and their dependents regardless of 
their place of employment or of residence"(para). The personal scope in Regulation 883/04 is 
extended quite a lot, and the recital states: “this Regulation is to apply to nationals of a member state, 
stateless persons and refugees resident in the territory of a member state who are or have been 
subject to the social security legislation of one or more member states, as well as to the members of 
their families and to their survivors” (para 7). 
 
The material scope is extended in the new regulation, and now two more benefits, sickness benefit 
and family benefit, have been added to the matters covered (Article 3 883/04).  
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The principle of the aggregation of periods completed in another member state was given greater 
priority as it is now defined clearly in the general provisions in the new Regulation (Article 6 
883/2004), where it was before placed in different provisions in the Regulation. The principle of 
aggregation of periods was more vaguely formulated in 1408/71 (Article 9, 1408/71)(Cornelissen 
2007:37).   
 
As the ECJ interprets teleologically and therefore draws upon the objectives of the legislation it 
interprets, we want to determine if there are any relevant differences between the recitals of 
Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 883/04.  
 
The substantial differences between the recitals of Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 883/04 are 
small. The main objectives specified in both recitals are to secure the free movement of workers, the 
standard of living and equal treatment. However, there is a difference in the way they refer to the 
national social security systems in the member states. In Regulation 883/04 it is written that it is: 
“necessary to respect the special characteristics of national social security legislation and to draw up 
only a system of coordination”, whereas Regulation 1408/71 only contained that consideration in half 
a sentence: “taking into account the considerable differences existing between national social 
security legislations”. In Regulation 883/04 it is made much more clear that the member states’ 
individual social security systems must be respected.  
Another relevant difference between the recitals is that it is stated in the recitals of Regulation 883/04 
that: “The Court of Justice has on several occasions given an opinion on the possibility of equal 
treatment of benefits, income and facts; this principle should be adopted explicitly and developed, 
while observing the substance and spirit of legal rulings” (para 9), whereas the ECJ’s legal rulings 
are not mentioned in Regulation 1408/71. This explicit recognition indicates an increased importance 
of the principle of equal treatment today compared to when the first Regulation was written. It 
furthermore explicitly reminds the member states to take into account the ECJ’s legal development of 
the rules when applying them. 
 
Since Regulation 883/04 entered into force in May 2010, there have been four amendments; 
Regulation 988/2009, Regulation 1244/2010, Regulation 465/2012 and Regulation 1224/2012 
(Commission: EU social security coordination). By readings of them, we found that the amendments 
do not add remarkable changes to the regulation. They mostly add exceptions to the Annexes or 
simplify the texts written in the Annexes.  
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In the new Regulation 883/04 more importance is attached to the principle of equal treatment and to 
the principle of aggregation of periods than in the original regulation. These changes can be said to 
sum up the relevance/meaning of the rules today, and we will bear these changes in mind when in the 
following interpreting a few newer judgements. Even though two of them were judged after 
Regulation 1408/71 (because the legal conflict occurred before Regulation 883/04 entered into force 
in May 2010), the judgement fell after Regulation 883/04 entered into force and the understanding in 
the new regulation might  therefore have been taken into account by the ECJ when judging in the 
cases.  
 
4.5 Two new cases on family benefits: Case C-257/10 Bergström and C-619/11 
Chassart  
Alongside with the new judgements on student grants, problems between national law and the rules at 
the EU level has also occurred in the area of social security in the recent years. The most important 
cases in this development are Bergström (C-257/10) and Chassart (C-619/11) on family benefits. In 
the cases respectively Sweden and Switzerland asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on whether an 
EU member state can require that an EU national has completed a period of work, residency or 
insurance in the respective country before they can receive family benefits. 
 
In the Bergström case, the Swedish authorities rejected Mrs. Bergström parental benefits at the 
daily sick leave benefit level (‘PBDBL’) with the argument that she had not been employed in 
Sweden for 240 consecutive days prior to childbirth (Bergström para 18 & 23). Before moving to 
Sweden, she had been employed in Switzerland, which has an Agreement with the EU that oblige 
them to follow the EU’s rules on coordination of social security scheme.  
The ECJ found that Sweden in its rejection of Mrs. Bergström failed to aggregate her periods of 
work in Switzerland as though they were periods completed under Swedish legislation. The ECJ 
ruled that to ensure the free movement of persons the institution of a member state “would not be 
able to demand that an insurance period must have been completed in its own territory in addition to 
a period of employment or self-employment completed in another member state – in the present case, 
in Switzerland” (para 44). It thus makes it clear that it is prohibited for a member states to require that 
a calculation period must be completed in its own territory in addition to the periods completed in 
other member states. While referring to 42 EC (now 48 TFEU), the ECJ furthermore concludes that 
the “freedom of movement would be impeded if a national of a Contracting Party were to be placed 
at a disadvantage in his country of origin solely for having exercised his right of movement” (para 28, 
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43). Hereby ECJ points to the fact that it will not be possible to achieve the free movement of persons 
if the right to social benefits for migrant workers is not guaranteed. It thereby argues with reference 
to the overall objective of the legislation that it interprets. In para 41 the ECJ describes: “The wording 
both of Article 8(c) of the Agreement and of Article 72 of Regulation No 1408/71 is completely 
unambiguous”, and the ECJ thereby states that the rules on aggregation of insurance, employment, 
and self-employment can not be interpreted in a different way than meaning that such an additional 
requirement is prohibited.  
 
In the case concerning Mrs. Dumont de Chassart (C-619/11), the Belgian national Mrs. Chassart 
applies for orphans’ benefits in Belgium after having lost her husband and moved back to Belgium 
after 15 years of employment in France. She worked in Belgium for one month before she turned 
unemployed, and first she is granted family benefits for orphans by the Belgian authorities, but after a 
few months they decided to deny the Mrs. Chassart the family allowance. The explanation was that a 
minimum period of at least six flat-rate monthly payments employment, by either the survivor or the 
death person, must have taken place in Belgium during the 12 months immediately preceding the 
death of the one parent. The ECJ rules that Mrs. Chassart falls within the personal scope of 
Regulation 1408/71 and that her periods of employment in France are therefore to be taken into 
account as if they were completed in Belgium when calculating her right to receive family benefit 
(para 27 to 31). In the judgement the ECJ even point out that the principle was also stated in the 
Bergström case [2011] (para 50, 51 & 52); there must be equal treatment and no discrimination (para 
33,43,55).  
In its judgement the ECJ furthermore draws upon Treaty stated principles and emphasises that Art. 
45 TFEU, Art. 48 TFEU, Art. 21 TFEU, and Regulation 1408/71 are “intended in particular to 
prevent the situation in which a worker who has exercised his right of free movement is treated, 
without objective justification, less favourably than one who has completed his entire career in only 
one member state”. The above mentioned Treaty Articles are fundamental for the EU system, and 
when the ECJ draws upon them in both this case and in Bergström, the Treaty principles are given 
effect for the special rules on social security coordination.  
 
The two cases, Chassart and Bergström, thus clarified the rules on the aggregation of periods. It 
made it clear that a limitation of the free movement of persons made by requiring a person from 
another member state to have completed an additional period of work or insurance in its own territory 
before being able to receive social security benefits cannot be justified. These two cases can be seen 
as clarifying the ECJ’s former justification of certain limitations to the equal treatment in order to 
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ensure a level of integration. In these cases, it make it clear that a limitation in form of an additional 
period of employment or insurance in the host state is not legitimate and cannot be justified. The 
reason why the cases of Bergström and Chassart are interesting to pay attention to is that the 
clarification of the rules may influence the general development in the area of social security, and 
therefore also might influence the judgement in the Finnish case. We will look into the Finnish case 
in the next section. 
 
4.6 The Dano case 
Even though the ECJ interprets the legitimate limits to the free movement of persons more and more 
narrowly, the ECJ has just judged in a matter, where it justifies a limitation.   
 
The 11th of November 2014 the ECJ made its judgement in the very discussed case, Dano C333/13, 
in which two Romanian nationals Ms. Dano and her son moved to Germany, where they applied for 
basic provisions for job seekers. The German government denied them the benefits, because Ms. 
Dano had not entered Germany seeking for work. Also, she had not been trained in a profession and 
at the time searching for the benefits, she had still not worked in either Germany or Romania. In the 
case the ECJ ruled: 
“A Member State must therefore have the possibility, pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2004/38, of 
refusing to grant social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to 
freedom of movement solely in order to obtain another Member State’s social assistance although 
they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence” (para 78). 
 
Hereby the ECJ clarified the rather unclear broad rules in Directive 2004/38 by justifying that 
economically inactive Union citizens can legitimately be denied social benefits if  they do not have 
sufficient resources and if they do not use their free movement for anything else than obtaining social 
benefits in another member state than their own. The new Dano judgement thus shows that the ECJ 
still accept/justify some limitations to the free movement of persons as long as the aim of the 
limitation is legitimate, which it is in Dano where it searches to avoid people moving within the EU 
only to obtain the right to social benefits.  
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4.7 Partial conclusion: valid law on social benefits 
Without originating in the social chapter of the TFEU (Art. 151 to 161 TFEU), a wide legal framework 
and considerable case law have emerged on social benefits. The relevant legal framework consist of 
Regulation 1612/68 (now Regulation 492/11), Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 883/04) with legal 
basis in the Treaty provisions on the Free movement of Persons and Directive 38/2004 with its legal 
basis in the provisions on the Union citizenship. The legislation coordinate EU nationals’ right to social 
advantages, social security and social assistance, and as seen in the analysis, both the personal end the 
substantive scope of the rules have been expanded largely by the ECJ’s case law since the first 
secondary legislation came into force.  
 
All three pieces of secondary legislation contains provisions laying down the principle of equal 
treatment on grounds of nationality for EU nationals making use of their free movement. It is especially 
with reference to this main rule that the ECJ has over time expanded the personal and the substantive 
scope of the rules in its case law. The personal scope of the two Regulations on social advantages and 
social security has been expanded to cover all economically active persons and their dependents. The 
introduction of the citizenship directive and the ECJ’s interpretations of its impact has further extended 
the personal scope and entailed that now EU citizens can be entitled to social assistance if they are 
lawfully residing in another member state for more than three months and are no economic burden to the 
member state. By reference to the equal treatment, the ECJ has also expanded the substantive scope of 
the rules by interpreting the rules in a way giving moving EU citizens the same rights to the same social 
benefits as the nationals of the different member states, and more benefits has been taken under the 
rules. The restrictions to this main rule has been interpreted very narrowly. The ECJ has only allowed 
the member states to limit the equal treatment by indirect discrimination if the discrimination was 
pursuing the aim of ensuring a certain minimum level of integration in the member state or ensuring that 
the moving EU nationals do not only move to claim benefits. It has been made clear by the ECJ that any 
limit that can be justified also has to be proportionate.  
 
The ECJ’s broad interpretation of the other main rule in the coordination of social security benefits, the 
aggregation of periods, has limited the member states’ possibilities for legitimately constructing 
additional national requirements for granting persons from another member state the right to social 
benefits in their territory. From the ECJ’s case law it is clear that it is now prohibited for the EU 
member states not to take into account periods of work, insurance or residence in another member state 
as though they were periods completed in their own. The broad interpretation of this main rule has 
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caused that many additional requirements have been deemed prohibited by the ECJ because they were 
disadvantaging EU nationals who had made use of their free movement. The limitations to this main 
rule have been interpreted narrowly in the same way as those for for equal treatment by being subject 
for the justification test. 
 
Overall, it is thus clear from the analysis that the ECJ has been interpreting the rules after the objective 
of ensuring the free movement of persons. In ensuring this free movement, the ECJ has  not only been 
drawing upon principles from the secondary legislation. In some cases it has referred directly to the 
governing treaty articles, Article 45, 48 and 21 TFEU ensuring free movement for citizens of the Union, 
giving them direct effect in cases discriminating persons who have exercised their free movement in the 
Union.  
 
Thus, the rules have been extended to cover practically all EU citizens residing in another member state 
for more than three months, under narrowly interpreted limitations, and the ECJ’s interpretations have 
drawn more and more benefits under the rules as well. In the present, principled Finnish case, it is 
possible that one more benefit, unemployment benefit, can be drawn under the coordination rules and 
that the limitations to the rule of the aggregation of periods can be narrowed down even further. In the 
light of the results on the valid law today, we will in the next section analyze the legal conflict and the 
possible outcomes of this Finnish case.  
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Chapter 5: The Finnish case on unemployment benefits  
The preceding part of the analysis defines the broader rules on social benefits and interprets some of the 
problems they have resulted in and how they have affected the development of the rules. In the 
following we will narrow down which of these rules and principles that can be seen as relevant for the 
present Finnish case on unemployment benefits, which is the latest example of problems arising 
between national rules of a member state and the EU coordinating rules on social benefits.   
 
5.1 The specific rules on unemployment benefits  
Article 6 in the general rules of Regulation 883/04 lays down the rule that the competent institutions 
of the member states shall “take into account periods of insurance, employment, self-employment or 
residence completed under the legislation of any other member state as though they were periods 
completed under the legislation which it applies”. Apart from the general rules in Regulation 883/04 
that we have also been going through in the above, the unemployment chapter in Regulation 883/04 
(Chapter 6) contains special rules for this benefit and an extra condition for taking into account 
periods completed in another member state.  
 
Article 61(1) in the chapter on unemployment benefit repeats the rule of the aggregation of periods, 
but specifies that for unemployment benefits, only periods of insurance, employment or self-
employment shall be taken into account. This means that periods of residence completed in another 
member state should not be taken into account when calculating the right to unemployment benefits. 
It limits the personal scope of the rules, because, as seen in the above analysis, it is in most cases on 
the ground of legal residence in another member state that citizens are granted access to social 
benefits. This restriction thus excludes citizens from the scope of the specific rules on unemployment 
benefits. Therefore, the rules only apply to workers in the sense it is today interpreted by the ECJ; 
almost everyone pursuing an economic activity.  
 
To better understand the interpretation of the specific rules on unemployment benefits, we have 
looked through all the case law on the rule of the aggregation of periods in Article 61(1) (Appendix 
2). Through the earlier cases, a broad interpretation in line with the interpretation of the general rules 
in the first part of the analysis is seen. In the earlier cases, the ECJ has for instance stated that the 
periods of work and insurance, which “are completed in another member state must be taken into 
account by the institution of the competent member state, even if such periods would not have been 
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considered as periods of insurance under the legislation of that State” (case 126/77 Frangiamore) 
and that “unemployed workers seeking work in another member state are for a limited period to 
retain entitlement to unemployment benefits provided for by the legislation of the State in which they 
were last employed even though they are not available to the employment services of that State” (case 
Sinclair C-62/91). Thus, the main rule of the aggregation of periods in Article 61(1) has in the same 
way as the general rules been interpreted broadly after the objective of ensuring workers who have 
exercised their right of free movement the same access to unemployment benefits as national 
workers. 
 
Apart from the general rules of the aggregation of periods of employment, insurance or self-
employment in Article 61(1), the rules contain, as mentioned, an extra condition for taking into 
account periods completed in another member state. Article 61(2) of Regulation 883/04 reads 
(emphasis added): 
 
“... the application of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be conditional on the person concerned 
having the most recently completed, in accordance with the legislation under which the benefits are 
claimed: 
– periods of insurance, if that legislation requires periods of insurance, 
– periods of employment, if that legislation requires periods of employment, or 
– periods of self-employment, if that legislation requires periods of self-employment”  
 
This is not new to the rules; the same condition was laid down in Article 67(3) of Regulation 
1408/71, only with a slightly different wording: “the person concerned should have completed 
lastly…”.  This formulation is quite imprecise as it might be read both as meaning simply that the 
most recent periods completed by the applicant has to be in accordance with the legislation under 
which the benefit is now sought and as meaning that the most recently completed periods have to 
have been completed under the legislation which the applicant is now claiming benefits under; that is 
in the member state where the applicant is now claiming unemployment benefit. 
 
In the latest case law on the unemployment benefit articles, the case Chateigner from 2006, the ECJ’s 
interpretation of the rules was closest to the latter. It concerned a French national, Mrs. Chateignier, 
who moved to Belgium, but was denied unemployment benefits to begin with because the Belgian 
authorities did not think she fulfilled the conditions for the entitlement to unemployment benefits 
(Chateignier C-346/05). The ECJ applied the principle of equal treatment and ruled that the Belgian 
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argument of denying Mrs. Chateignier benefits because she did not have French nationality was 
against EU law, because it discriminates on ground of nationality. However, the ECJ did not rule that 
the Belgian argument of only granting her unemployment benefits after she had worked in Belgium 
for one day was against EU law (Ibid.). It thus indicate that the ECJ’s interpretation of the rule in 
Article 61(2) is closest to the understanding of the rules that the most recently completed periods 
have to have been completed under the legislation which the applicant is claiming benefits under, 
which is in this case the Belgian legislation. 
 
Also when Rob Cornelissen, legal advisor on employment and social affairs at the Commission, took 
stock of the rules and the case law on unemployment benefits in 2007, he pointed to the latter 
interpretation. When going through the case law, he concludes that on grounds of the condition in 
Article 61(2) and its predecessor, the provisions on the aggregation of periods regarding 
unemployment benefits do not apply to workers seeking employment in another member state than 
the one in which they last worked or were insured (Cornelissen 2007:44). He argues that because the 
wording of Regulation 1408/71 and 883/04 are so similar regarding this specific question, the older 
case law is still relevant and points to several earlier cases (case C-62/91, joined cases C-88/95, C-
102/95 and C-103/95 and case c-320/95) in which the ECJ left it to the national court to determine 
whether it would take periods completed in another member states into account because of the special 
rule in what is now Article 61(2) in Regulation 883/04.  
 
What Rob Cornelissens outlines is the valid law as it was understood in 2007, but as we know from 
earlier, the ECJ’s teleological interpretation has continuously been expanding the rules, and one 
might have to see the specific rules on unemployment benefits in another light today than in 2007.  
 
When asking Jon Kvist, professor at Roskilde University on European Public Policy and expert at the 
Danish Government Commission on unemployment insurance, it was his opinion that both the political 
and the legal circumstances has changed since then (Appendix 3). He argued that as “the legislation is 
very dynamic in this area” and “the Court continues to interpret deeper and broader”, the newer cases 
on family benefits and student grants are very likely to influence the area of unemployment benefit.  He 
also pointed to the fact that the political situation has changed remarkably since 2007 when Rob 
Cornelissen outlined the valid law at the time: 
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“The Court's interpretations are constantly moving forward (...) and for example the crisis in Europe at 
the moment is pushing forward the idea that the EU should be seen as one big labour market, meaning 
that if you cannot find work in Spain, you may go where it is possible to find work (...). It is an era 
where it is more important than before to remove the limits for the free movement to ensure that there 
are no holes with a need for workers and others with big unemployment" (appendix 3). 
 
He argued, that in this context it is therefore likely that the political and structural circumstances and 
the newer judgments in other areas of the rules on social benefits has outpaced Cornelissen's 
interpretation of the rules in 2007 and that this extra condition for taking into account periods of 
employment or insurance completed in another member states is of less importance today than in 
2007 (appendix 3). One may on the basis of that assessment presume that today it is enough that the 
periods completed in another member state are in accordance with the legislation of the member state 
in which the benefit is sought. 
 
As seen above, some parts of the specific rules on unemployment benefits have been clarified 
through the case law, but a case concerning an additional requirement like the Finnish requiring a 
certain amount of the work to have been completed in the host state has never before been brought 
before the ECJ concerning the specific rules in the chapter on unemployment benefit in Regulation 
883/04. Therefore, there are no direct indications from the case law of whether an additional 
requirement as the Finnish can be justified, so the judgement in the case will have fundamental 
importance and specify the rules at this point. We will  in the following go through the pending 
Finnish case, define the legal conflict and point to the possible judgments in the case. 
 
5.2 Legal conflict and possible judgements in the pending Finnish case 
The pending Finnish case on unemployment benefits is the latest example of problems arising 
between national legislation of a member state and the EU rules coordinating social security. In 2011, 
the Commission started an infringement procedure (article 258 TFEU) against Finland for breaching 
the rules regarding aggregation of periods for unemployment benefits. Finland rejected in both the 
preceding informal and the following formal steps of the infringement procedure to comply with EU 
law and has therefore now been taken to Court (European Commission 20.11.2013).  
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In the Commission’s press release from November 2013 when announcing that it would take Finland 
to Court, the Commission stated that an additional requirement in the Finnish legislation for periods 
of work to be completed in Finland before taking into account periods completed in another member 
state "discriminates against workers that have worked in other member states (both Finns and 
nationals of other member states) and is in breach of EU law to ensure free movement of workers." 
(appendix 5). The Commission argued that the Finnish additional requirement therefore breaches 
Article 45 TFEU and Article 61 of Regulation 883/2004. 
 
The Finnish legislation require that migrant workers applying for unemployment benefit must, in 
addition to their work in another member state, have worked in Finland immediately before 
becoming unemployed. Chapter 5, Article 9 of Finland’s Unemployment Security Act 1290/2002 
lays down the condition for taking into account periods of employment or insurance completed in 
another member state that the person applying for the benefit has worked at least four weeks as a 
worker or four months as self-employed in Finland immediately before he or she turned unemployed 
(Unemployment Security Act 1290/2002). 
 
According to the Finnish legislation, the applicant's periods of insurance, employment or self-
employment completed in another member state are not taken into account, if this requirement is not 
met (Unemployment Security Act 1290/2002). The result of this additional requirement is thus 
practically that an applicant, who is otherwise living up to the requirements in Regulation 883/04 and 
has completed the periods of employment or insurance necessary to be entitled to unemployment 
benefits in Finland in another member state, is nevertheless denied these benefits, if he has not also 
worked in Finland right before turning unemployed. It is this consequence of the Finnish rule which 
the Commission argues ends up discriminating workers who have worked in another member state. 
 
Thus, the legal conflict is a conflict between the Finnish requirement and Article 45 TFEU establishing 
the free movement of workers and abolishing “...any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers…”. The legal conflict is also clear between the Finnish legislation only taking into account an 
immigrant worker’s periods of insurance and employment in another member state if he or she has also 
worked the acquired amount of time in Finland and Article 61 of Regulation 883/2004 requirering 
periods of insurance, employment or self-employment completed under the legislation of any other 
member state to be taken into account “as though they were completed under the legislation it applies”, 
which is here the Finnish legislation. The legal conflict between the Finnish rule and EU law can 
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therefore be seen as a conflict between the principles of one of the four fundamental freedoms in EU 
and Finland protecting its national welfare system and its solidaric mechanisms. 
 
Finland has had these specific rules since 2002, and the reason why the Commission did not start an 
infringement procedure before might be linked to the judgements in the examined, newer cases on 
students grants and family benefits, which showed that it is prohibited to require a link such as the 
link in the Finnish legislation, even though the rules on aggregation of periods according 
unemployment benefits are different from the general rule in Regulation 883/04. As Jon Kvist 
assessed the situation, the judgments in cases in the other areas influences the understanding and 
limits of the specific rules on unemployment benefits, too (appendix 3). Another possibility is that the 
Commission simply did not know about this part of the Finnish legislation until recently. 
 
To better understand why Finland did not comply when informed of the breach of EU law, one can look 
at the arguments in the Finnish response to the Commission’s reasoned opinion (appendix 4). After 
informal discussions of the matter since 2011, the Commission issued a formal notice to Finland on 
March 26 2012 with its opinion on the Finnish rules, but Finland denied all allegations in its answer. 
The Commission did not recognise the Finnish counterarguments and send Finland a reasoned opinion 
on May 31 2013. The Commission’s arguments have been the same all the way; that Finland’s 
additional requirement is discriminating workers who have worked in another EU member state and is 
in contradiction with EU legislation (Memo 13-470). Finland’s counter arguments was that Article 61(1) 
and 61(2) of Regulation 883/04 does not prevent  the Member States from laying down the requirement 
of a period of work in their own territory which shall be taken into account for the rule of the 
aggregation of periods to apply (appendix 4). 
The Finnish Government argued in their answer, that they read the provisions as meaning that the 
Member States are competent to define their national law and therefore also what employment or 
insurance periods means for their own unemployment benefits (Ibid.). 
 
The Commission’s reasoned opinion is the second stage of the infringement procedure laid down in 
Article 258 TFEU, and as Finland still rejected to comply with EU law, the Commission has taken 
Finland to Court (European Commission 20.11.2013). At the time of writing, the action is not 
formally brought against Finland, but it will soon be transferred to the ECJ (appendix 6). Meanwhile, 
the Danish Government has stepped in at Finland’s side in the case (Statsministeriet 11.03.2014). 
Denmark has a similar rule requiring 296 hours of work to have been completed within three months 
in Denmark before applying for benefits in order to take account of periods of work or insurance 
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completed in another member state (EU-oplysningen 14.03.2014). Thus, the judgement in the Finish 
case will also have consequences for Denmark, and therefore the judgement is awaited in tension. 
Denmark has furthermore set down a special commission looking at the Danish rules on 
unemployment benefit, which can indicate the seriousness of the Danish worries for the judgement in 
the Finnish case. A judgement in line with the recent judgement in the other areas deeming the 
additional requirement prohibited would mean that Denmark, having the same type of requirement as 
Finland, would have to change their legislation not to be taken to Court themselves. Such a 
judgement could be seen as limiting further the member states’ possibilities for limiting non-
nationals’ access to their social benefits which might explain the Finnish and Danish awareness and 
opposition to the Commission’s position in the case.  
 
In the light of the ECJ’s recent opinions it does not seem very likely that the ECJ will completely 
justify the Finnish additional requirement, and when we talked to law professor Jon Kvist, it was also 
his view that it will be deemed prohibited (appendix 3. He argues that the Finnish requirement is 
clearly discriminative (appendix 3), and as we saw earlier, recent judgements has limited the 
possibilities for restricting social benefits to nationals of a member state by an additional requirement 
like the Finnish. Especially the newer German cases on student grants and the cases Chassarts and 
Bergström on family benefits have shown that the member states are not allowed to have additional 
requirements in their own legislation to the rules in the common legislation discriminating people 
who have worked, lived or studied in another member states in their access to benefits. The 
interpretation of the ECJ in these cases is likely to influence its judgments on other benefits in the 
area as well and might more than likely influence the Judgement in the Finnish case, as it with its 
teleological interpretation normally  interprets broader and deeper all the time. However, as before 
mentioned, the ECJ has in some cases allowed a slight discrimination as long as it is proportional and 
serves as a mean to ensure that the applicant has a certain degree of integration in the member state in 
which he applied for a social security benefit. It is probably not that likely that the Finnish additional 
requirement meet these requirements of the justification test as it is quite general, but it is only to 
been seen by the ECJ’s judgement whether another expansion of the rules to an easier access to 
unemployment benefits for non-nationals will be a reality or not. 
 
The Finnish case is an example of how the valid law on social benefits and the recent years 
widenings of the rule of the aggregation of periods affect a concrete case today, and as seen above, it 
is possible that the Finnish case will widen further the rules. In the following chapter, we will leave 
the specific case and put in perspective the results of these legal analyses by a discussing analysis of 
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the consequences of the broad development for the member states and the possibilities they are left 
with. Before starting the discussion, we will present the politological theory behind it.  
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Chapter 6: Politological theory: Court decisions traps and the Court’s 
political power 
Through the legal analysis we have observed how the ECJ has extended the principles on the rules on 
social benefits through case law, even though the member states have often not agreed with the 
interpretation. The following will examine the concepts from the theorists Karen Alter, Gerda Falkner 
and Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen to explain how and why the member states have ended up in a 
precarious political situation, where many of them do not agree with the interpretation of the legislation 
they have adopted themselves. We will also use the theorists to understand which possibilities the 
member states have for rewriting the legislation or adopting new legislation that can turn the 
development of the rules regarding social benefits as developed by the ECJ’s case law.   
 
6.1 Court decisions traps 
Gerda Falkner, Head of the Institute for European Integration Research at the University of Vienna, has 
developed a theory on how decision traps can occur in the EU decision-making (Falkner 2011:9). She 
describes decision traps as following:  
“With respect to the EU, one could speak of an EU decision trap whenever it is not (yet) able to act and 
when the member states are no longer in capacity to do so” (Falkner 2011:9). 
She underlines, that decision traps can occur both in the obligatory negotiations and in situations and 
institutions outside the traditional decision-making process. 
 
One type of decision trap is what Falkner calls the court-decision trap, and she describe this decision 
trap as the most extreme (Falkner 2011:11). This kind of decision trap appears in situations where the 
ECJ acts as a policy-setter by interpreting the Treaties specifically in its rulings on specific areas. The 
problematic about such a situation, according to Falkner, is that the politicians from the member states 
can only revise such a ruling, where the ECJ refers to Treaty articles with direct effect and thus give 
rights to individuals, with Treaty changes which have to be ratified in all member states. According to 
Falkner, a court decision trap can also occur by the ECJ judging activisticly on the basis of  secondary 
legislation expanding its scope beyond what the member states intended with the legislation. In this 
case, it is possible for the member states to exit the court decision trap by changing the secondary 
legislation. 
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Falkner develops further the different exit mechanisms, which the member states can use to escape the 
court-decision trap (Falkner 2011:12). One way to escape the court decision trap is to use what Falkner 
describes as the problem-solving orientation, where the member states overcome their disagreements. 
This possibility for overcoming problems may be strongest in areas with long standing co-operation and 
realistic prospects for a co-operative future. Another way of exiting the court decision trap would be to 
make a new kind of ‘decision rule’ to the legislation that the member states wish to change. This way 
the member states gain more control over the legal development. If a decision-making process is based 
on qualified majority voting or majority voting instead of unanimity, there will be a bigger chance of 
changing the legislation, and thereby change the path of development by the ECJ (Falkner 
2011:7,11,12).   
 
In addition to her notion of the court decision trap, Falker emphasises that the Commission and the ECJ 
have significant influence on the decision-making process. Therefore, she argues, when consensus exists 
between them on which way the development in a certain area of the EU policy should go, they might 
act under what she calls a supranational-hierarchical mode in which policy can be developed without 
the legislative bodies; the EP and the Council. For example the Commission can start an infringement 
procedure, if it thinks that certain national rules of a member state breaches EU law, and afterwards the 
ECJ may judge the case, if the member state does not comply. Falkner emphasizes that the ECJ has a 
‘judicial policy-making’ power, and underlines that it can be extremely hard for the member states to 
correct the ECJ’s policy-making power through political action (Falkner 2011:5).  
 
Falkner has also, together with Dorte Martinsen, Deputy head and professor at Department for Political 
Science at Copenhagen University, applied the concept of the development of the rules on social 
security and especially the ECJ’s role in the development,on the rules on social benefits in the EU. 
Therefore we will use their views and analyses in our discussion of what possibilities the member states 
have for changing the legislation on the rules on social benefits. 
 
6.2 Concepts of time horizons and credible threat 
Karen J. Alter, Professor in Political Science and Law at the Political Department at Nortwestern 
Univerity in Illonois, develops a general theoretical understanding of how the ECJ “build legal doctrine 
based on unconventional legal interpretations and expands its own legal authority, without provoking a 
political response” (Alter 1998:118). She also explains the differences between the political acting of 
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the member states and the ECJ which can be caused by concepts she calls different time horizons of 
courts and political actors and creating a credible threat (Alter 1998:133). 
 
Referring to the different time horizons, Alter argues that one of the reasons why the ECJ can develop a 
doctrine that goes against the long term interests of the different member states is that politicians mostly 
focus on short-term results of their decisions rather than their long-term implications (Alter 
1998:118,133). Therefore, even though politicians are not blind for long term consequences, they are 
more likely to act against judicial activism if it has political and financial consequences in the present 
and they are less likely to act against judicial activism, such as ECJs narrow interpretations, if it does 
not raise problems in the current national legislation. As Alter explains, the politicians in the member 
states are most concerned about their own short-termed national interests (Alter 1998:118). Alter also 
points to the fact that the Commission is an accomplice in the efforts of the ECJ to build doctrinal 
precedence without arousing political concerns (Alter 1998:119). This is done by, for example, 
proposing legislation in an area the member states had not thought of making policies in.   
 
Another concept, Alter established, builds on a situation in the EU where governments cannot 
selectively opt out of the legal system so they have to renegotiate the jurisdictional authority or rewrite 
EU legislation if they want to stop the courts from deciding against national interests (Alter 1998:134). 
From there, Alter hypothesizes that as long as key states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, protect 
the ECJ, it difficult to overcome the institutional constraints. But if the key member states would begin 
to be dissatisfied with the ECJ’s decisions, ECJ would properly moderate its jurisprudence to avoid the 
member states agreeing on reforming its legal power, by for example rewriting the Treaties. Oppositely, 
when some member states refuse to take power from the ECJ, the ECJ can be expected to decide against 
the interests of the powerful member states (Alter 1998:135) 
 
In our discussing analysis we will with the use of concepts from the theory first look into, which 
political situation the member states are in, and afterwards examine which possibilities the member 
states have both politically and legally, if they wish to stand up against a decision from the ECJ. Dorte 
Martinsen has written specific literature on the development and court decision traps in the social 
security area. Her theory and factually facts will be used throughout the discussion as well.  
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Chapter 7: Discussing analysis: The member states’ possibilities for 
changing the direction of the development of the regulation of social 
benefits 
In the following section we will put the results of the legal analysis into a political context by discussing 
the member states’ situation and their possibilities to change it. 
 
7.1 The member states’ situation  
“Even though the ECJ likes to post modestly as ‘the guardian of the treaties’ it is in fact an 
uncontrolled authority generating law directly applicable in Common market” (Alter 1998:117). While 
these are Alter’s words, we could also conclude in our legal analysis that the ECJ has played a 
remarkable role in developing the EU nationals’ rights to social benefits in other member states by 
widening the scope of the legislations and its interpretations. Then, in what political situation does it 
leave the member states?  
 
As it is to a great extent the ECJ’s case law which have been propelling policy development forward, 
one may argue that the member states’ autonomy over the development has been narrowed. As we saw 
in the analysis, the member states had to incorporate the ECJ’s extensions of the rules when making the 
new Regulation 883/2004, for example by changing the rules to apply to Union nationals and not only 
workers as a result of the ECJ’s rulings. Martinsen (2005) has pointed to the fact that the member states’ 
autonomy to define social security schemes and welfare principles is being compromised as case law 
makes it increasingly difficult for the member states to disregard the EU law as it is interpreted by the 
ECJ (Martinsen 2005) 
 
Apart from the ECJ’s will to expand the rights in this area, Falkner has noticed that in social security 
coordination, the Commission has also always spoken for further integration and therefore promoted its 
development as well. “Together the Court and the Commission constitute a powerful tandem of 
supranational-hierarchical steering and non-political powers,” Falkner and Martinsen explain, 
referencing the remarkable impact of the two supranational institutions, in advancing social integration 
“to an unexpected extent” (Falkner & Martinsen 2011:144). In a report published in 2013 on the 
improvements that the Commission considers necessary, it is clear that the Commission still lobbies for 
further integration (and especially in the area of unemployment benefits, in fact), which indicates that it 
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will continue to try and push the member states in the direction of further extension of the rules in 
political negotiations as well (European Commission 12.03.13).     
 
On the other hand, the member states have generally spoken against extending the rules at the EU level 
concerning the coordination of welfare benefits. As we saw in the analysis, the member states 
incorporated the ECJ’s case law in the new Regulation 883/04, but besides that they did not add any 
new principles to expand the rules themselves. In that regard, Falkner and Martinsen observe that the 
member states have often achieved consensus about not wanting certain areas to be subject to the EU 
social (security) policy (Falkner & Martinsen 2011:145). Politicians from the different member states 
have for example held that establishing who has the right to access minimum benefits and where the 
benefits can be paid belongs to the repertoire of national competences and that the EU should not 
interfere with that kind of national redistribution (Falkner and Martinsen 2011:140). On that note, it is 
worth emphasising that the situation is not a political stalemate, in which the ECJ takes control; the 
member states did agree to keeping the question in national competence, but still more facets of the 
coordination of social security benefits have been brought to authoritative decision making by the 
ECJ  (Falkner and Martinsen 2011:145). 
 
In this vein, one can argue that the member states are caught in a court decision trap regarding the rules 
of social benefits: The ECJ expands the rules in the secondary legislation and interprets the treaties and 
general principles on free movement of persons as the principle of equal treatment on the grounds of 
nationality and the citizenship. The general rules and principles influence the specific rules on the 
coordination of social security and the limitations to the right to social assistance, against the will of 
many of the member states. Especially, the ECJ has welcomed the paradigm shift the citizenship has 
brought to the personal level of the rules as well. It has been repeatedly judged in line with making the 
citizenship the fundamental status of nationals from the member states. The expansion of the rules has 
only been magnified by the Commission who is also pushing for expanding the rules on social benefits. 
The consensus between the two institutions has caused a situation of ‘super hierarchical steering’ 
towards expanding the rules, which has only made it more difficult for the member states to act against 
the development. One can argue that this situation thus has the characteristics of what Falkner calls a 
court decision trap.  It is within this court decision trap, which the member states have limited 
autonomy, causing the progressive steps for EU nationals’ access to social benefits. 
 
 48 
 
7.1.2 National preferences and different Time horizons  
The above conclusion seems to be that the member states have passively been overruled by the ECJ and 
are now helpless to the ECJ’s power. From the opposite perspective, one could also ask if it is not just 
the national politicians’ own fault. Could they not just have made the legislation more restrictive from 
the beginning? 
 
Concerning the rules on social benefits, which have now been explained, the member states have been 
part of formulating and adopting new laws. One may argue that they should have taken a more 
protectionist stance from the beginning in the formulation of their legislation. They could for example 
have kept more benefits out of the coordination rules or they could have added more provisions or 
conditions to the rules, which could maybe have limited the ECJ’s ability to expand the scope of the 
rules and their interpretations.  
 
Before concluding that blaming the member states for not drafting the legislation restrictively enough 
from the beginning is justifiable, one may suggest the perspective that has always existed as a critique of 
political decisions that is held by Alter: politicians’ decisions are often relatively short-termed. 
Therefore, the national politicians of the member states might, when negotiating the first regulations and 
their amendments, have been willing to trade off having more long-term restrictions or limitations 
written into the legislation in exchange for allowing specific benefits or considerations for specific 
national rules to be written into the rules.  They might have not drafted such restrictive laws because it 
protected their economic situation or satisfied a national political demand at that time. In comparison, 
the ECJ’s approach to the rules has been more long-term and by its teleological interpretation it has 
conversely interpreted the rules after their traditional opinion of the free movement of workers and long-
term general aims of primarily ensuring equal treatment. Because the member states did not set up that 
many long-term restrictions to the expansion of the rules, the ECJ has had lots of room to interpret the 
rules skewed towards their general aims with a long-term perspective. Alter even argues that the ECJ 
and the Commission have made use of this difference in time horizon of the member states and the ECJ 
respectively in a more or less deliberate strategy by which they could expand the legal framework of the 
common rules on social benefits, undisturbed as long as they made sure not to compromise the national 
politicians’ short term interests (Alter 1998:120).  
 
At the same time, it must be kept in mind that Regulation 1612/68 and 1408/71 were written in a very 
different political situation than the one we see today. As described in the analysis, the rules were made 
decades ago to ensure the free movement of the workforce to reduce the lack of labour in some regions 
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and unemployment in others. Therefore, while the member states’ decisions when drafting the 
legislation may be criticised for being short-termed, one may on the other hand argue that it can have 
been difficult for them to predict the expansions of the rules, influenced by new perspectives as the 
citizenship and the ECJ’s increased focus on principles as equal treatment. They have, over time, 
created a very different context for the rules.  
 
One may also add that the complication of the rules and the long, complicated negotiations among the 
member states has sometimes been a deliberate strategy for the national politicians. As Martinsen and 
Falkner argue, the member states sometimes use a delaying strategy when drafting the rules 
emphasising that the national systems are so different from one another and add the many annexes to 
national considerations, exceptions and special rules (Martinsen & Falkner 2011:145). As they also 
point out, that it has been a dangerous strategy of self-defence as it has lessened their ability to jointly 
overrule the ECJ and has given the ECJ further possibilities for reinforcing its line in developing the 
legislation with each national case. One may thereby argue that the member states could have been more 
successful in overruling the line of the ECJ if they had been willing to each put down their national 
principles and considerations and agree on more unambiguous, concrete rules that could restrain the 
ECJ’s broad interpretation.  
 
Thus, many different political aspects, more than the above mentioned, have led to the current situation. 
Whatever the reasons, a big part of the member states now find themselves in a situation where they 
think that the rules in the area and the rights they confer to EU citizens has been expanded upon too 
much. Therefore, the next sections will be concerned with the question of whether and how it is possible 
to revise the legislation that the member states disagree with, legally and politically.  
 
The member states do have different legal and political possibilities for changing the direction of the 
development in the area of social benefits and thereby exiting the court decision trap. As we saw in the 
legal analysis, it has especially been the expanding interpretation of the secondary legislation, which has 
widened and broadened the rules on social benefits. Therefore we will start by discussing the member 
states’ possibilities to change the relevant secondary legislation. As we also saw in the legal analysis 
that the ECJ has sometimes referred to the general principles in the Treaties when expanding the area, 
we will afterwards discuss the member states’ possibilities for rewriting the relevant treaty articles.  
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7.2 The member states’ possibilities 
7.2.1 Changing the secondary legislation  
Because many of the recent judgements have given rise debate and some member states refuse to 
comply with EU law because of the rules in Regulation 1408/71 or its predecessor 883/04 and Directive 
38/2004, we will discuss possible changes of these two pieces of legislation.  
 
As mentioned in the legal analysis, Regulation 883/04 was adopted on basis of Article 42 TEC (now 48 
TFEU) which allows the European Parliament and the Council to adopt the necessary measures in the 
area of social security by the ordinary legislative procedure1.The procedure gives the same weight to the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the legislative process, and is the main 
legislative procedure by which directives and regulations are adopted (Article 294 TFEU). The 
citizenship Directive 2004/38 was similarly adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure, on basis of, 
i.a., Article 18 TEC (now 21 TFEU). Thus, if the Regulation 883/04 or the Directive 2004/38 were to be 
reopened, the changes would have to be adopted by the EP and the Council by the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Reopening the negotiations would require the Commission, the EP or a group of member 
states to take the initiative for a change in the existing legislation or enact a new one (Article 294 
TFEU). 
 
When the regulation on the coordination of social security benefits was last negotiated, the Commission 
was advocating for simplifying and expanding the coordination of social security benefits. Therefore it 
is considered unlikely that the Commission would now take the initiative to limit or restrict the 
coordination (EUR-Lex: Procedure: Regulation 883/04). During the same discussions of the Regulation 
on the coordination of social security, the parliament was generally positive about the changes proposed 
by the Commission. They only had a few objections, which were generally in favour of securing the 
rights for persons moving and obtaining work in a member state other than their own (EUR-Lex: 
Procedure: Regulation 883/04). Of course this can have consequences with politicians in the parliament 
and a new President, but last time the specific rules in Regulation 883/04 were discussed in depth was 
before the regulation was enacted in 2010.  We will use these discussions as a point of departure. From 
the EP’s position last time the negotiations were open, it does not seem likely that they would suggest a 
proposal limiting citizens’ possibilities to receive social benefits in the EU either. Also in the 
negotiations concerning the Citizenship Directive 38/2004, the EP and the Commission did not express 
                                                          
1
 This procedure was back then called the co-decision procedure, but after the Lisbon treaty was enacted it was renamed the ordinary legislative 
procedure 
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any considerable concerns for the development in the area of social assistance (EUR-Lex: Procedure: 
Directive 2004/38). If Regulation 883/04 were to be reopened, the request for a proposal would 
therefore most likely have to come from a group of member states dissatisfied with the development in 
the area. The Commission would then have to submit the proposal from the member states, and if it 
does, the negotiations could be reopened. This is the reason why we will in the following mostly focus 
the member states’ possibilities for agreeing on changing the legislation and how this change would be 
possible in practice.  
 
The voting rule in the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure is qualified majority (Article 16 
TEU). Therefore, contrary to the voting procedure under unanimity, one or few member state cannot 
prevent the rest of the member states from changing the legislation or adopting new ones. As illustrated 
above and in the introduction to the project, the dissatisfaction with the development of the coordination 
of social benefits in the EU is evident among some of the member states. 
 
There is an example of a situation where the member states in the Council succeeded in an action of 
rolling back a piece of secondary legislation. In 1992, the Council managed to overrule the ECJ’s 
interpretations in the area of social security benefits by adopting a regulation which specified that 
certain benefits with characteristics between social security and social assistance should be made non-
exportable to hosting member states (Regulation 1247/92). The did it by adopting Regulation 1247/92 
amending 1408/71 which added an exception to the coordination system and narrowed down the 
material scope of the regulation. Martinsen mentions this as an example of how the member states can 
re-politicise control over the legislation and thereby give a “lesson to the ECJ” (Martinsen 2013:14). 
The example can thus be seen as supporting the argument that the member states can succeed in 
changing the ECJ’s development of the rules through secondary legislation. In the present situation they 
could choose to do the same; adopt a special Regulation or revise the existing, adding restrictions on 
which benefits or which persons can fall under the Regulation 883/04 or Directive 2004/38.  
 
Even though the aforementioned example shows how member states have been able to avoid the court 
decision trap by amending the regulation on the coordination of social security, there are also arguments 
disadvantaging the idea that the member states can circumvent the recent development in the area. The 
strongest might be that the member states’ preferences in the area of social security have always been 
quite nationalistic and quite fragmented as it was most recently seen in the negotiations on Regulation 
883/2004 (EUR-Lex: Procedure: Regulation 883/04). The Commission proposed a substantial reform of 
Regulation 1408/71 already in 1998, with the objectives of slimming the annexes to the Regulation of 
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different national reservations and returning to a more consistent regulatory scheme as a whole (Ibid.). 
However, the negotiations progressed very slowly, and many member states vetoed letting their 
different reservations in the annexes go (EUR-Lex: Procedure: Regulation 883/04). The long period of 
negotiation is the evidence of all the member states’ compromises when legislating in this regard, 
because the member states individually had strong national preferences in the area of social security, 
which is a topic of high political salience (Martinsen 2013:13). In this light it might be improbable that 
the member states would reopen the negotiations - and all the compromises - any time soon. And even if 
they did reopen the negotiations, the strong national preferences might make it difficult for them to 
agree on adopting new secondary legislation or on changing an already existing piece of secondary 
legislation. As seen in the introduction to the project, it is not all the member states who are agitating for 
changing in the rules today either; the western member states call for restrictions on the rules governing 
social benefits while the eastern member states defend the right of free movement of persons.  Thus, in 
the present situation is does not seem very likely either that the member states would manage to agree 
on changing the legislation in a way restricting the free movement of persons, if the negotiations were 
reopened. 
 
If the member states nevertheless should succeed in changing aspects of the secondary legislation 
concerning the rules on the distribution of social benefits, one may argue that it might still not be 
enough to change the development in the area because the ECJ has often been referring to Treaty 
Articles, especially Article 21 and 45 and 48 TFEU, and given them direct effect in cases on social 
benefits. If the ECJ chooses to refer to Treaty Articles when it rules on the material or personal scope of 
the rules on social benefit in the secondary legislation, it can be circumvented. Therefore the changes of 
secondary legislation will not necessarily be sufficient to stop the ECJ’s interpretations expanding the 
rules on social benefits in the EU.  
 
One argument is that no matter how many rules the member states change in the secondary legislation, 
the ECJ decides the further specifications or clarifications of the legislation (Martinsen et Falkner 
2011:18). When the ECJ then interprets the legislation teleologically, the specifications of the rules are 
likely to extend the law, and therefore the member states’ restrictions can not circumvent the 
development of law in the area in the long-term perspective. For the same reason,  the member states’ 
changes of the legislation also have to be rather specific and extensive, if they shall be able to 
circumvent the development of law in the area in the long-term perspective. And one may argue that, 
because of the aforementioned strong national preferences in the area, they are not very likely to be able 
to agree on very extensive changes of the Regulation if they reopen it. 
 53 
 
 
Other examples show that even though all member states agree on a clear change or even on rolling 
back the ECJ’s decisions, they can not always succeed. The clearest example is the annulment of 
Regulation 647/2005 which was adopted by the Council and the European Parliament after difficult 
negotiations and introduced a new definition of special non-contributory benefits in Regulation 883/04 
(Martinsen 2013:142). The Commission had requested the ECJ to annul the adopted Regulation 
647/2005, because the UK, Finland and Sweden had at the same time wrongly inserted some benefits in 
the Annex to the Regulation. So, instead of taking each of the three member states to Court, the 
Commission chose to bring an annulment procedure against the Council and the European Parliament, 
in accordance with Article 263 TFEU (Martinsen & Falkner 2011:143). Like the Commission, the Court 
found that the benefits had been wrongly listed in the Annex, and should have been made exportable 
according to the rules of the Regulation (Martinsen 2013: 3). In October 2007 the ECJ ruled that the 
regulation had to be annulled. This situation shows that even when all the member states agree, they do 
not manage to roll back the decisions of the ECJ.   The Commissions and the ECJ’s super-hierarchical 
steering in a direction of broader rules thus makes it very difficult for the member states to act against 
the expansions of the rules on social benefits.  
 
7.2.2. Changing the Treaties  
As referenced in the section above, changing the secondary legislation might not be enough to 
circumvent the ECJ’s expansion of the personal and substantive scope of the rules on social benefits. 
The next and more comprehensive possibility would be to change the treaty articles which we saw from 
the legal analysis are drawn upon by the ECJ when expanding the scope of the rules: Article 45 TFEU, 
Article 48 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU. The Treaty of Lisbon amended the procedures for changing the 
treaties so that now two possibilities exist; the ordinary revision procedure and the simplified revision 
procedure (Article 48 TEU).  
In the ordinary revision procedure a group of member states, the Commission or the European 
Parliament may submit proposals for revising the Treaties (Article 48(2) TEU). Then, the European 
Council can deliver an opinion in favour of calling an intergovernmental conference (IGC), after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Commission. After a conference, the subsequent 
amendments to the Treaty enter into force after being ratified by all the member states in accordance 
with each of their constitutional requirements. The Treaty Articles on which the ECJ’s interpretation is 
based can thus by the ordinary revision procedure only be reversed by unanimous agreement in an 
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Intergovernmental Conference that must be ratified in all member states (Falkner 2011:5). Changing 
Article 21 TFEU would require the use of this ordinary revision procedure. 
 
However, not all treaty articles have to be changed by the ordinary revision. The treaty articles in Part 
Three of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union can be changed by the simplified revision 
procedure (Article 48(6) TEU). By this procedure the member states can submit proposals for changing 
treaty provisions in Part Three relating to internal policies and action to the Council. The Council can 
then, after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, unanimously adopt a decision to 
amend one or more of the treaty provisions. The decision must not increase the competences conferred 
on the Union in the Treaties. This decision will enter into force when it is approved by the member 
states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. If the member states wanted to 
change Article 45 or 48 TFEU it could be done by the simplified revision procedure and therefore be 
easier than changing Article 21 TFEU, as it would not need ratification in all the member states, but 
only approval. Regardless of this difference, both procedures for amending the treaties would require 
the member states to agree on changing the treaties, either unanimously in the Council for changing the 
provisions of Part Three by the simplified revision procedure or by reaching consensus on an IGC in the 
ordinary revision procedure. It is therefore necessary to discuss whether the member states are likely to 
agree on changing the treaties in the present situation.  
 
In the ongoing discussion on welfare tourism, mostly smaller changes to the secondary legislation has 
been discussed among the national politicians of the member states, but changing the Treaties to solve 
the problem has also been brought up. The British Prime Minister David Cameron has both in the spring 
and recently in the fall mentioned treaty changes on the free movement as a solution to EU migrants 
moving to the UK and receiving benefits, which the UK think is a big problem for their national welfare 
system. In the spring one of the heavy players in the EU, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, refused 
Treaty changes as a solution, even though, as seen in the problem area, she has at more than one 
occasion expressed dissatisfaction with the result of the expansion of the rules on social benefits.  At a 
European summit on October 25th this fall, she even put into words that she would rather see the UK 
leave the EU than change the treaty provisions on the free movement of persons (BBC News 
03.11.2014). As we saw in the above discussion, Germany has not been the only one expressing the 
view that the principle of free movement should be protected. Thus it seems rather improbable that all 
the member states could agree unanimously on changing Article 45 and 48 TFEU on the free 
movement. The member states might still be able to agree on calling for an IGC for changing the treaty 
articles on the free movement or Article 21 TFEU on the citizenship, as it would only require a simple 
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majority. But even if the member states should end up calling for treaty changes, it is quite a challenge 
and very time consuming for 28 member states to agree on a treaty change, especially when it involves 
high politics (Falkner 2011:5). Accessing welfare communities and exporting welfare rights have indeed 
a questions of high political salience, and with the long and complicated discussions characterised by 
national preferences seen in the negotiations of the secondary legislation in the area, it would probably 
be even more difficult for the member states to agree on changes on treaty level (Falkner 2011:8).  
 
Even if the member states should agree on treaty changes and get them ratified or approved in all 
member states, the ECJ can still end up interpreting the restrictive changes rather narrowly, as it will 
still have the power of specifying and clarifying the scope and the reach of the rules in the Treaties. 
There is furthermore the possibility that the member states’ restrictions might over time be overruled of 
some of the even more overall principles from the preamble(s) or for example  from Article 18 
prohibiting discrimination on ground of nationality, because of the ECJ’s teleological interpretation.  
 
The last possibility might be to renegotiate the ECJ’s power and change the treaty provisions governing 
it. This would mean changing Article 19 TEU. 
Besides the fact that it would require an IGC and ratification in all the member states, which would 
make the situation quite complicated, Alter argued in 1998, that it would also obstruct the renegotiation 
of the ECJ’s jurisdictional authority that some member states, especially Germany and the Netherlands, 
have always protected the Court  (Alter 1998:134). Since then Germanyand other member states have 
remained quite strong supporters of the EU system and the ECJ, and it might thus take more than the 
discussion on welfare tourism for the member states to be willing to renegotiate the ECJ’s role. 
 
On the other hand, as Alter argues, less drastic action than renegotiating the ECJ’s jurisdiction might 
change its broad interpretation. According to Alter, even though the member states should not succeed 
in renegotiation the power of the ECJ, their remarks about the legislation being interpreted too broadly - 
and the underlying threat that they might agree on limiting its autonomy - mights make the ECJ narrow 
its interpretations.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
From being rules only coordinating the access to social security benefits and social advantages for 
workers moving within the Union, the legal framework on social benefit has been widened and 
deepened to also cover practically all EU citizens legally residing in another member states for more 
than three months in their access to social assistance and some social advantages and social security 
benefits. Today the member states can only legitimately limit the equal treatment on ground of 
nationality in regard to the rules in order to ensure a certain degree of integration for the applicant for 
social benefits or to avoid that EU nationals move only to claim benefits - and such limits can only be 
justified, if they are proportionate. With the pending Finnish case on unemployment benefits, the rules 
on one more benefit are likely to be expanded and the member states’ possibilities for putting up 
limitations to them narrowed down.  
 
That development has brought the member states in a situation where the scope of the legislation, they 
have been enacting themselves, is being expanded more than some member states agree with. That 
situation can with Falkner’s concept be seen as a court decision trap because the changes is a result of 
the ECJ’s interpretation of general principles in secondary and primary legislation, and they are difficult 
to act against. 
 
To profoundly roll back or change the development of the rules which today entails that more and more 
EU nationals have the right to claim social benefits in another member state than their own, the Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of person or the citizenship of the Union would have to be changed. 
Since they have both come to be fundamental principles in the Union which the Commission, the ECJ, 
the EP and most of the member state find very important to protect, it is not very likely that they will be 
willing to act so drastically as changing the Treaties to roll back the expansion of the rules on social 
benefits.  
 
The big part of the expansions of the rules in the case law which do not rely on the Treaties would be 
able to roll back or to change by amending or adopting new secondary legislation. Could a group of the 
member states agree on proposing changes and would the Commission submit the proposal, the 
negotiations of the relevant secondary legislation could be reopened. The member states have both 
before and now expressed very different positions regarding the rules on social benefits, so it is unlikely 
that such negotiations would lead to very profound changes, but could enough member states agree on 
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changes, they could be adopted by a qualified majority in the Council - if the EP approves the proposal 
as well.  
If we should come to see changes of the rules as a result of some of the member states dissatisfaction 
with the current scope of the rules, it will therefore most likely be in form of adding more or less 
comprehensive restrictions in the secondary legislation. Since the ECJ will still be able to interpret the 
secondary legislation after its objectives of ensuring the free movement of persons and after the treaty 
articles ensuring equal treatment on ground of nationality in this regard, it is not certain that such 
changes in the secondary legislation would hinder further widening and deepening of the rules for good. 
It would however probably be able to narrow the scope of the rules for a period.  
 
8.1 Perspectivation 
If we were to further develop our project, we could add other theory, supplement our empiric data with 
other elements or combine other methods with the ones, we already use in the project It would give rise 
to other answers, aspects and discussions. 
 
As mentioned in the section on our choice of empiric data, we soft law is left out of the project, and 
were we to further develop the project, we could supplement our empiric data with the different 
voluntary initiatives on social policy regarding social benefits and other soft law in the area. It would 
contribute to our conclusions by showing what the member states, who we conclude in this project are 
quite hostile to expansions of the binding rules on social benefits, actually do want to cooperate on in 
social and welfare policy. It would also contribute with creating an understanding of how these rules 
impact on the national welfare systems and rules and therefore indirectly in the development of the 
coordination rules on social benefits at the EU level as well. In this regard, we could also include the 
Treaty articles on social policy in our empiric data to be able to understand the relation between them 
and the legal framework on social benefits, which now has their roots in other parts of the Treaties, but 
can be said to cover areas of social policy.  
 
As we have mentioned earlier, it could also be a possibility to focus more on the political debate 
between the member states on the area of social benefits and in this context examine more profoundly 
their different preferences. To understand their argumentation and preferences, we could use as empiric 
data more thoroughly the different debates in the Council and eventually in their national parliaments 
about the coordination of social benefits in the EU. It could likewise be useful to study the national 
media in the member states to see what national discourse on social benefits the national politicians also 
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have to navigate in and respond to when acting politically in the EU. We could examine this data by the 
use of politological theory on how political preferences are being formed and eventually power theory 
about how some preferences get more weight than others in the decision making process in the EU. 
With adding such a focus we could achieve a better understanding of the political reality in the EU and 
in the different member states and how it interferes and can in the future interfere on the development of 
the rules on social benefits in the EU.  In this context we could also go further into the EP and the 
Commission and how their preferences are formed and interplay of those of the Council in the decision 
making process in the EU in this area. 
 
A more different way in which we could have answered our problem formulation could have been to 
focus more on the problematic about the legitimacy of the ECJ’s role in the EU. Our legal analysis of 
the ECJ’s expansion could also give rise to a more normative discussion of the legitimacy in a system 
where policy is also developed by institutions without politicians elected by the people. It would have 
been interesting to use political theory to discuss whether it can be seen as a democratic problem when 
the ECJ expands and defines the rules on social benefits. To do that we could for example have studied 
it by examining whether the population find that there is a legitimation problem with the EU and the 
ECJ, and discussed it against politological theory on different conceptions of democracy and legitimacy 
in a political and legal system. The result of such a focus could be a more varied understanding of the 
relation between ECJ and the member states, not only seeing the member states as 28 units, but as 
consisting of people which support the EU is partly dependent on.   
 
Of course, these other focuses are only examples of which complementary or other perspectives, the 
project gives rise to examine. There are many other ways in which it would be interesting to further 
develop our project, but these we see as the most evident.   
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Appendix 1: Applied legal sources 
 
Applied legal sources in the legal analysis (Chapter 4): 
 
Treaty articles: 
 TFEU Article: 4, 6, 20,21, 45, 46, 48, 258 
 TEU: 2, 48, 21 
 EEC: 48 
 EC: 39 
 
Regulations: 
 Regulation 1612/68: 7 
 Regulation 492/11 
 Regulation 1408/71, articles: 3, 4, 9,10,14,72 
 Regulation 883/04, articles: 6,7,13,  
 
Directives 
 Citizenship Directive 2004/38: 7, 12, 14 (1,2)(3), 16, 24 
 
 
Applied legal sources in the analysis of the Finnish case (Chapter 5): 
 
Regulations 
 Regulation 1408/71, articles: 67, 72  
 Regulation 883/04, articles: 2,61, 67 
 Amendments to Regulation 883/04: Regulation 988/2009, Regulation 1244/2010, Regulation 
465/2012 and Regulation 1224/2012.   
 
 Finland’s Unemployment Security Act 1290/2002 
 
 
Applied legal sources in the discussing analysis (Chapter 6):  
 
Treaty articles: 
 TFEU: 21, 45, 48, 263, 294 
 TEU: 16, 19, 48 
 
Regulations: 
 
 Regulation 883/04:  
 Regulation 1408/71: 
 Regulation 1247/92 
 Regulation 647/2005 
 
Directives:  
 Directive 2004/38 
 
Appendix 2: Applied judgements 
 
 
Judgements referred to in the legal theory: 
 
 CILFIT (C-283/81) 
 
Judgements referred to in the legal analysis: 
 
 Bergström C-257/10 
 Bidar C-209/03 
 Chassart: C-619/11 
 Collins C-138/02  
 Dano C-333/13 
 Hendrix C-287/05 
 Geven C-213/05 
 Gierch C-20/12 
 Grzelczyk C-184/99 
 Joint cases C-523/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v 
Studentenwerk Heidelberg have 
 Scholz C-419/92  
 Vatsouras c-22/08 
  
 
Judgements referred to in the analysis of the Finnish case: 
 
 Sinclair C-62/91 
 Chataigner C-346/05    
 C-62/91, joined cases C-88/95, C-102/95 and C-103/95 and case c-320/95 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 
Transcription of interview, Jon Kvist, Professor, The Department of 
Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University 
 
October 9 2014 
 
Vi, Mathilde Nordenlund og Signe Lerche, introducerer os selv til Jon og forklarer derefter, hvad vi 
skriver bachelor om. Mathilde Nordenlund styrer interviewet.  
 
M: Hvad er det for nogle nye domme, der kan have ændret forståelsen for, hvornår man kan 
modtage dagpenge, hvilket der gør, at Finland nu bliver taget for retten? 
 
J: Der behøver ikke at være nogle nye domme, men hvis vi nu kigger på de danske familieydelser, 
der blev sagen startet af en embedsmand i en organisation, som har fået en henvendelse fra en 
tysker, som bor og arbejder i Danmark, og som er sur over, at han ikke får fuld familieydelse pga. 
det princip, regeringen havde indført omkring optjening. Og så tager organisationen kontakt til 
Kommissionen, og så lægger Kommissionen sag an mod Danmark. Så sagen i Finland kan også 
have startet pga. en utilfreds borger, en “triggering event”, men jeg er ikke sikker. Finland vælger så 
at tage sagen til domstolen og lade den få en mere principiel karakter. Der er ikke tradition for, at 
det er Kommissionen, der går ud og finkæmmer national lovgivning for at finde en sag.  
 
M: Vi har ledt og ledt efter sådan en “triggering event”, som kan have startet den finske sag, men vi 
har ikke fundet en sådan. 
 
J: Ja, og det er jo nok i Finland, at I skal finde den, så det kan godt være, sprog er en vanskelighed 
her. Ved danske familieydelser for eksempel, tror jeg ikke, der er ret mange, der er klar over, 
hvordan den sag overhovedet startede. Muligvis kan I skrive til nogle af de myndigheder, der 
administrerer dagpenge i Finland. Måske er det en organisation, der hedder KELA. 
 
M: Vi har allerede prøvet at ringe til dem for at indsamle den information, der er tilgængelig 
foreløbigt, og det er også der, vi har fået deres ‘reasoned opinion’ på Kommissionens henvendelse.  
 
J: Ja, fordi de som ansvarshavende myndighed kunne tænkes at vide, hvad der er op og ned i sagen. 
Men det er nok ikke noget, der er mange i Finland, der ved.  
 
M: Men det er nok heller ikke nødvendigvis det, der er vores hovedfokus, det er mere, hvordan de 
sidste års domme på andre områder kan have haft indflydelse på den dom, der vil falde i den finske 
case. Vi har selvfølgelig kigget rigtig grundigt på Chassart og Bergström og på nogle af de nye SU-
domme. Kan de sige noget om, hvad det sandsynlige udfald i den finske case vil være? 
 
J: Som I sikkert har diskuteret med Lisbet, så har domstolen en teleologisk arbejdsgang, så den 
tolker dybere og bredere hele tiden - så grænsen om, hvad der skal ligge nationalt og hvad EU skal 
blande sig i bliver hele tiden rykket. Logikken er lidt; to skridt frem og ét tilbage. Det vil højest 
sandsynligt være sådan, at Finland vil få at vide, at det er ulovligt. Og Danmark har altså en stor 
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interesse i den her sag. Hvis Finland ikke får at vide, at det er ulovligt, vil der sikker komme en sag 
om nogle få år af en tilsvarende karakter, hvor man vil bedømme det ulovligt.  
 
J: Det er meget sandsynligt, at det vil ske. Det her krav om, at der skal være arbejde i Finland er jo 
helt tydeligt gjort for at forhindre adgangen til deres ydelser, ikke, altså det er en 
diskriminationsforanstaltning. Det ligger lige for.  
 
M: Lige den forskel, der så er på unemployment i forhold til for eksempel børnepenge er det ekstra 
krav om, at det skal være the most recently completed, i det land hvor perioderne er mest recently 
completed, og kan man godt overføre forståelsen fra børnepenge til den finske case, selvom der er 
det forbehold i lovgivningen lige præcis på unemployment benefits? 
 
J: Ja, det vil jeg tro. Altså, det er jo hele tiden en tolkning af, hvad det er, man ser i det her.  
 
(Mathilde og Signe forklarer, hvad pointen er med Rob Cornelissen og forskellen på artiklerne om 
‘agggregation periods’ i forhold til ‘unemployment benefits’ i henholdsvis Regulation 1408/71 og 
Regulaiton 883/04) 
 
J: Det er jo hendes bedømmelse af, hvordan lovgivningen er tænkt i den kontekst, som hun sidder i 
på det tidspunkt. Det er jo der, man skal huske, at det hele tiden bevæger sig. Det er altså ikke 
skrevet i sten det her, det er skrevet i vand, haha. Det er dynamiske tolkninger, så hvis du tager for 
eksempel krisen, der er i Europa i øjeblikket, så er den jo med til at skubbe til ideen om at Europa 
skal ses som ét arbejdsmarked, sådan at hvis man ikke kan få arbejde i Spanien, må man tage 
derhen hvor der er mulighed for det, og der vil den type regel som Finland har blive opfattet som en 
barriere for den fri bevægelighed, men også for den fri bevægelighed i en æra, hvor man opfatter at 
det er desto mere vigtigt, at man fjerner de her grænser for at sikrer, at der ikke er huller med 
mangel på arbejdskraft og huller med stor ledighed.  
 
M: Og det er også en opfattelse, som domstolen tager til sig? 
 
J: Ja, eller ligger i skjul af, ikke. Min opfattelse… (fortæller om, at han synes, dommerne lever i en 
komplet anden verden, for eksempel paradoksalt, at de dømmer som de gør nu, hvor der har været 
så stor debat om velfærdsydelser i for eksempel Storbritannien) 
 
M: Derfor kan man godt sige, at den vurdering, Cornelissen lavede dengang, er blevet overhalet af 
nyere domme på for eksempel SU og børnepenge? 
 
J: Ok ja. Ja, det kan man sagtens og som sagt også af den politiske udvikling, hvor der jo har været 
en diskussion af det her spørgsmål, hvor der er en hel klar skelnen mellem de gamle lande og de 
nyere lande og der, hvad skal man sige, der ligger domstolen lunt, ikke, den kan jo gemme sig, fordi 
der ikke kan skabes enighed om at ændre på lovgivningen. 
 
J: Det er rigtig svært ikke, og det ved domstolen udmærket godt, så den har jo magt til at udfordre 
fortolkningen af reglerne. 
 
M: (runder af) 
 
J: Det krav Danmark har, er strammere end det Finland har, så hvis det finske er ulovligt, er det 
danske helt sikkert også. 
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M: Den er jo også blevet ændret, den her regulation, 1408 til 883 og især det her forbehold i 
‘unemployment benefits’, så det ikke hedder ‘lastly completed’ men ‘most recently completed’. 
 
J: Der er ikke stor forskel mellem de to regulation, den er blevet moderniseret, ja, men ellers tror jeg 
ikke, der er de store ændringer. 
 
M: (runder af igen) 
 
Vi lover at sende opgaven, når vi er færdige. 
 
 
Ulkoasiainministeriö 
          
TUOMIOISTUINMUISTIO UM2013-00897 
OIK-30 Reunanen Liisa(UM) 10.07.2013 
       
EU-ministerivaliokunnan kirjallinen menettely 10.-
12.7.2013 
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Asia
KOMISSION PERUSTELTU LAUSUNTO 2011/2220; Työttömyysetuuksiin oikeuttavien 
kausien yhteenlaskeminen
Perusteltuun lausuntoon vastaaminen – SEUT 48 artikla – 
Asetuksen (EY) N:o 883/2004 61 artikla – Työttömyysetuudet – 
Kausien yhteenlaskeminen – 4 viikon / 4 kuukauden 
työskentelyvaatimus 
 
 
Perusteltu lausunto  
 
Suomi on 31.5.2013 vastaanottanut komission perustellun lausunnon, joka koskee 
työttömyysetuuksiin oikeuttavien kausien yhteenlaskemista. Komissio katsoo, että 
työttömyysturvalain (1290/2002) 5 luvun 9 §:n mukainen edellytys, jonka mukaan 
muissa jäsenvaltioissa täyttyneet kaudet otetaan huomioon työssäoloehdon täyttämisessä 
vain, jos työskentely Suomessa on kestänyt vähintään neljä viikkoa tai yritystoiminta 
vähintään neljä kuukautta, ei ole yhteensopiva sosiaaliturvajärjestelmien 
yhteensovittamisesta annetun asetuksen (EY) N:o 883/20041 (jäljempänä  ”perusasetus”)  
kanssa.  
 
Määräaika perusteltuun lausuntoon vastaamiselle päättyy 31.7.2013. 
 
Komission antama perusteltu lausunto on toinen vaihe SEUT 258 artiklan mukaisessa 
rikkomusmenettelyssä. Jos komissio katsoo Suomen vastauksesta huolimatta edelleen, 
että Suomen lainsäädäntö ei ole asetuksen mukainen, se voi seuraavaksi viedä asian 
unionin tuomioistuimen käsiteltäväksi.   
 
Sovellettavat oikeussäännöt 
 
Unionin oikeus 
 
Perusasetuksen 1 artiklan t ja u alakohdassa säädetään seuraavaa: 
 
"Tässä asetuksessa tarkoitetaan: 
 
t) 'vakuutuskaudella' maksukausia, työskentelykausia tai itsenäisen 
ammatinharjoittamisen kausia, jotka on määritelty tai tunnustettu vakuutuskausiksi siinä 
lainsäädännössä, jonka mukaan ne ovat täyttyneet tai ne katsotaan täyttyneiksi, ja 
                                                 
1 Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetus (EY) N:o 883/2004, annettu 29 päivänä huhtikuuta 2004, 
sosiaaliturvajärjestelmien yhteensovittamisesta, EUVL L 166, 30.4.2004, s. 1-123. 
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kaikkia sellaisina käsiteltäviä kausia, jos niiden katsotaan kyseisessä lainsäädännössä 
vastaavan vakuutuskausia; 
 
u) 'työskentelykaudella' ja 'itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kaudella' kausia, jotka on 
sellaisiksi määritelty tai tunnustettu siinä lainsäädännössä, jonka mukaan ne ovat 
täyttyneet, ja kaikkia sellaisina käsiteltäviä kausia, jos niiden katsotaan kyseisen 
lainsäädännön mukaan vastaavan työskentelykausia tai itsenäisen 
ammatinharjoittamisen kausia." 
 
Perusasetuksen 6 artikla kuuluu seuraavasti: 
 
"Jollei tässä asetuksessa toisin säädetä, sen jäsenvaltion toimivaltaisen laitoksen, jonka 
lainsäädännön mukaan 
 
 etuuksia koskevan oikeuden saavuttamiseksi, säilyttämiseksi, keston 
määrittämiseksi tai takaisinsaamiseksi 
 lainsäädännön soveltamiseksi tai 
 pakollisen, valinnaisen jatkuvan tai vapaaehtoisen vakuutuksen piiriin 
pääsemiseksi tai siitä vapauttamiseksi 
 
edellytetään vakuutuskausien, työskentelykausien, itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen 
kausien tai asumiskausien täyttymistä, on otettava tarpeellisessa määrin huomioon 
toisten jäsenvaltioiden lainsäädännön mukaan täyttyneet vakuutuskaudet, 
työskentelykaudet, itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kaudet tai asumiskaudet, ikään kuin 
nämä kaudet olisivat täyttyneet kyseisen laitoksen soveltaman lainsäädännön mukaan." 
 
Perusasetuksen 61 artiklassa säädetään seuraavaa:  
 
”1.   Sen   jäsenvaltion   toimivaltaisen   laitoksen,   jonka   lainsäädännön   mukaan   etuuksia 
koskevan oikeuden saavuttamiseksi, säilyttämiseksi, takaisinsaamiseksi tai keston 
määrittämiseksi edellytetään joko vakuutuskausien tai työskentely- taikka itsenäisen 
ammatinharjoittamisen kausien täyttymistä, on otettava tarpeellisessa määrin huomioon 
vakuutus-, työskentely- tai itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kaudet, jotka ovat täyttyneet 
toisen jäsenvaltion lainsäädännön mukaan, ikään kuin nämä kaudet olisivat täyttyneet 
sen soveltaman lainsäädännön mukaan. 
 
[---] 
 
2. Jäljempänä 65 artiklan 5 kohdan a alakohdassa tarkoitettuja tapauksia lukuun 
ottamatta tämän artiklan 1 kohdan soveltamiseksi edellytetään, että asianomainen 
henkilö on viimeksi, sen lainsäädännön mukaisesti, jonka mukaan etuuksia haetaan, 
täyttänyt 
 
– vakuutuskausia, jos kyseinen lainsäädäntö edellyttää vakuutuskausia, tai 
– työskentelykausia, jos kyseinen lainsäädäntö edellyttää työskentelykausia, tai 
– itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kausia, jos kyseinen lainsäädäntö edellyttää 
itsenäisen  ammatinharjoittamisen  kausia.” 
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Kansallinen lainsäädäntö 
 
Työttömyysturvalain 5 luvun 9 § kuuluu seuraavasti:  
 
”Jos   Suomen   tekemän   sosiaaliturvasopimuksen   taikka   sosiaaliturva-asetuksen tai 
perusasetuksen säännösten mukaan muussa valtiossa täyttyneet vakuutus- tai 
työskentelykaudet on luettava työssäoloehtoon, edellytyksenä niiden huomioon 
ottamiselle on, että henkilö on työskennellyt Suomessa välittömästi ennen työttömyyttä 
palkansaajana  vähintään  neljä  viikkoa  tai  yrittäjänä  vähintään  neljä  kuukautta.” 
 
Asian tausta ja merkitys Suomen kannalta 
 
Työttömyysturvalain mukaan työttömyyspäiväraha myönnetään joko ansiopäivärahana 
tai peruspäivärahana. Työttömyyspäivärahan saamisen edellytyksenä on työssäoloehdon 
täyttyminen. Palkansaajan työssäoloehto täyttyy, kun henkilö on edellisten 28 kuukauden 
aikana ollut työssä vähintään 34 viikkoa. Palkansaajan työssäoloehtoon luettavalta työltä 
edellytetään lisäksi, että henkilön työaika on yhteensä vähintään 18 tuntia 
kalenteriviikossa, työ on vakuutuksenalaista ja työstä saatava palkka täyttää tietyt 
vähimmäismäärät. Yrittäjän työssäoloehto puolestaan täyttyy, kun henkilö on edellisten 
48 kuukauden aikana työskennellyt vähintään 18 kuukautta yrittäjänä siten, että 
yritystoiminta on ollut laajuudeltaan olennaista. Yrittäjän työssäoloehtoon luetaan 
vähintään neljä kuukautta kestäneet työskentelyjaksot. 
 
Asiassa on kyse siitä, millä edellytyksillä muissa jäsenvaltioissa täyttyneet 
työskentelykaudet tulee ottaa huomioon laskettaessa työssäoloehdon täyttymistä. 
Työttömyysturvalain 5 luvun 9 §:ssä edellytykseksi asetetaan, että henkilö on 
työskennellyt Suomessa välittömästi ennen työttömyyttä palkansaajana vähintään neljä 
viikkoa tai yrittäjänä vähintään neljä kuukautta.  
 
Komissio on 4.3.2011 esittänyt Suomelle mainittua säännöstä koskevan 
selvityspyynnön2, jossa se on pyytänyt Suomea ilmoittamaan, miten kyseistä säännöstä 
sovelletaan henkilöihin, jotka kuuluvat perusasetuksen soveltamisalaan. Suomi on 
vastannut tiedusteluun 6.7.2011 päivätyllä kirjeellä. Komissio ei ole tyytynyt annettuun 
vastaukseen vaan on 20.7.2011 käynnistänyt asian selvittämisen EU Pilot -ohjelmassa.3 
Suomi on vastannut tiedusteluun EU Pilot -ohjelman kautta 28.9.2011.  
 
Komissio on 26.3.2012 antanut Suomelle virallisen huomautuksen asiasta ja Suomi 
vastasi tähän huomautukseen 25.5.2012. Suomen vastauksessa kiistettiin komission 
väitteet.  
 
Jos 4 viikon tai 4 kuukauden työssäolo- tai yritystoimintavaatimuksesta luovuttaisiin 
vakuutuskausien huomioon ottamisessa komission vaatimalla tavalla, lisäisi tämä 
sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön Kelan tilastojen perusteella tekemän arvion mukaan 
työttömyyspäivärahansaajia vuositasolla vähimmillään noin 3000 henkilöllä ja 
enimmillään jopa 60 000 henkilöllä. Todennäköisesti työttömyyspäivärahan saajien 
määrä olisi kuitenkin lähempänä 3000 henkilöä kuin 60 000 henkilöä. Jos arvioidaan, 
että työttömyyspäivärahan saajien määrä lisääntyisi 3000 henkilöllä, joista joka neljäs 
olisi perheellinen, sosiaaliturvan (työttömyysturva, terveydenhuolto, sairausvakuutus ja 
perhe-etuudet) menot lisääntyisivät kaikkiaan 35,8 miljoonalla eurolla, josta 
työttömyysturvamenot yksinään olisivat 26 miljoonaa euroa. 
                                                 
2 Komission selvityspyyntö EMPL/B4/MHA/In(2011) 4.3.2011. 
3 EU Pilot 2308/11/EMPL; komission tiedustelu 20.7.2011. 
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Komission omaksuma tulkinta merkitsisi sitä, että kustannusvastuu henkilön 
työttömyysturvasta, ja sen mukana muusta sosiaaliturvasta, voisi syntyä käytännössä 
välittömästi henkilön tultua maahan, vaikka mitään maksuja asianomaisiin järjestelmiin 
ei ole vielä suoritettu eikä etuuksien ja maksujen välistä yhteyttä ole syntynyt. Tämä 
heikentää järjestelmien taloudellista kestävyyttä. 
 
Komission väitteet 
  
Komissio toteaa työttömyysturvalain 5 luvun 9 §:n tarkoittavan sitä, että työntekijät ja 
itsenäiset ammatinharjoittajat, jotka ovat ennen työttömäksi joutumistaan työskennelleet 
Suomen työmarkkinoilla alle neljä viikkoa palkansaajien tai alle neljä kuukautta 
yrittäjien tapauksessa, eivät ole oikeutettuja Suomen työttömyysetuuksiin. Tämän 
komissio katsoo olevan vastoin SEUT 48 artiklan sekä perusasetuksen tarkoitusta, joka 
on edistää siirtotyöläisten mahdollisimman vapaan liikkuvuuden toteutumista unionissa. 
 
Koska perusasetuksessa ei täsmennetä, milloin vakuutus-, työskentely- tai itsenäisen 
ammatinharjoittamisen kausi on täyttynyt, käsitettä on komission mukaan tulkittava 
laajasti yhdessä SEUT 48 artiklan kanssa. Komissio huomauttaa, että perusasetuksen II 
osaston mukaan siirtotyöläiseen aletaan soveltaa jäsenvaltion lainsäädäntöä heti, kun hän 
alkaa työskennellä kyseisessä jäsenvaltiossa. Myös kausien yhteenlaskemista koskevia 
sääntöjä sovelletaan täten täysimääräisesti kyseisestä hetkestä lähtien. Tästä seuraa 
komission tulkinnan mukaan se, että Suomessa työskentelevän henkilön muissa 
jäsenvaltioissa suorittamat kaudet olisi otettava välittömästi huomioon päätettäessä 
henkilön oikeudesta työttömyysetuuksiin ja etuuksien määrästä, vaikka henkilö olisi 
ennen työttömäksi jäämistään ehtinyt työskennellä Suomessa vain päivän. 
 
Komission näkemyksen mukaan perusasetuksen 61 artiklaa ei voida tulkita jäsenvaltiossa 
toteutuneiden vakuutus-, työskentely- tai itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kausien 
keston mukaan, sillä tämä muodostaisi sellaisen rajoituksen työntekijöiden vapaaseen 
liikkuvuuteen, josta olisi tullut nimenomaisesti mainita asetuksessa. Muunlainen tulkinta 
estäisi komission mukaan siirtotyöläisiä, jotka joutuvat työttömiksi ennen jäsenvaltion 
lainsäädännössä määritellyn työskentelyvaatimuksen täyttymistä4, saamasta 
työttömyysturvaa EU:ssa siitä huolimatta, että he ovat täyttäneet vakuutus-, työskentely- 
tai itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kausia jossakin unionin jäsenvaltiossa. 
 
Ehdotus Suomen kannaksi ja vastauksen päälinjat 
 
Kanta 
 
Suomi kiistäisi komission väitteet ja katsoisi, että työttömyysturvalain 5 luvun 9 § on 
SEUT 48 artiklan ja perusasetuksen 61 artiklan mukainen.  
 
Perustelut 
 
Suomen vastauksen perustelut vastaisivat olennaisesti niitä perusteluja, jotka Suomi esitti 
komission viralliseen huomautukseen 2011/2220 antamassaan vastauksessa.5 
 
                                                 
4 Tässä tapauksessa työntekijän työskenneltyä alle neljä viikkoa ja itsenäisen ammatinharjoittajan alle neljä kuukautta 
Suomessa. 
5 Suomen vastauksen päälinjat käsiteltiin oikeudelliset kysymykset - jaoston kirjallisessa menettelyssä 10.–11.5.2012 sekä 
EU-ministerivaliokunnan kirjallisessa menettelyssä 15.–16.5.2012.  
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Perusasetuksen 61 artikla jättää Suomen näkemyksen mukaan jäsenvaltioiden 
harkintavaltaan ensinnäkin sen, edellytetäänkö kausien yhteenlaskemiseksi ylipäänsä 
työskentelykausien täyttymistä, ja toisaalta sen, millä perusteilla henkilön voidaan katsoa 
viimeksi täyttäneen kyseisiä kausia puheena olevassa jäsenvaltiossa. Suomi katsoisi, että 
perusasetuksen 61 artiklan 2 kohdan perusteella jäsenvaltioiden harkintavaltaan kuuluu 
kansallisessa lainsäädännössään määrittää se, minkä pituista viimeisintä työskentelyä 
kausien yhteenlaskemisen periaatteen soveltamiseksi edellytetään, kunhan tämä 
määrittely tapahtuu unionin oikeuden sallimissa rajoissa.  
 
Vastauksessa yhdyttäisiin komission näkemykseen siitä, että siirtotyöläiseen aletaan 
soveltaa jäsenvaltion lainsäädäntöä heti, kun hän alkaa työskennellä kyseisessä 
jäsenvaltiossa. Vaadittavan vähimmäiskauden laskeminen alkaa siten siitä hetkestä, 
jolloin työnteko Suomessa on aloitettu. Tämä ei kuitenkaan estä jäsenvaltiota 
määrittelemästä sen työskentelykauden pituutta, joka tulee ottaa huomioon kausien 
yhteenlaskemista koskevan säännön soveltamiseksi. 
 
Perusasetuksen 1 artiklan u alakohdan mukaan työskentelykaudella tarkoitetaan kausia, 
jotka on määritelty kansallisessa lainsäädännössä työskentelykausiksi. Tämä sama 
määritelmä on toistettu perusasetuksen 1 artiklan t alakohdassa vakuutuskausien osalta. 
Suomen hallituksen näkemyksen mukaan säännökset tarkoittavat sitä, että jäsenvaltiot 
ovat toimivaltaisia määrittelemään kansallisessa lainsäädännössään tarkemmin, mitä 
työskentely- tai vakuutuskausilla tarkoitetaan ja miten kyseiset kaudet täyttyvät.  
 
Perusasetuksen 6 artiklassa määritetään kausien yhteenlaskemista koskeva pääsääntö, 
jonka mukaan vakuutus-, työskentely- tai asumiskausien täyttymiseksi on otettava 
huomioon toisessa jäsenvaltiossa täyttyneet vakuutus-, työskentely-, tai asumiskaudet 
ikään kuin nämä kaudet olisivat täyttyneet kyseisen jäsenvaltion lainsäädännön mukaan. 
Perusasetuksessa on kuitenkin erityissäännös kausien yhteenlaskemiselle 
työttömyysturvan osalta. Perusasetuksen 61 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaan kausien 
yhteenlaskemiseksi edellytetään, että asianomainen henkilö on viimeksi, sen 
lainsäädännön mukaisesti, jonka mukaan etuuksia haetaan, täyttänyt vakuutus-, 
työskentely-, tai itsenäisen ammatinharjoittamisen kausia, jos kyseinen lainsäädäntö 
edellyttää tällaisia kausia. 
 
Suomi katsoisi, että perusasetuksen 61 artiklan erityissäännös menettäisi merkityksensä, 
mikäli perusasetuksen 6 artiklaan sisältyvä, kausien yhteenlaskemista koskeva yleinen 
periaate tulisi aina sovellettavaksi välittömästi siitä hetkestä alkaen, kun henkilö on 
aloittanut työteon Suomessa. Vastauksessa katsottaisiinkin, että perusasetuksen 61 
artiklan säännöksellä on nimenomaisesti haluttu jättää harkintavaltaa jäsenvaltioille sen 
suhteen, millä edellytyksillä kausien yhteenlaskemista koskeva periaate tulee 
sovellettavaksi työttömyysetuuksista päätettäessä. Hallituksen näkemyksen mukaan tätä 
tulkintaa tukee myös perusasetuksen 1 artiklan t ja u alakohdan säännökset, joiden 
mukaan kausien tarkempi sisältö määritellään jäsenvaltion lainsäädännössä.  
 
Mitä tulee komission väitteeseen siitä, ettei perusasetuksen 61 artiklaa voitaisi tulkita 
kausien keston mukaan, vastauksessa kiinnitettäisiin huomiota 61 artiklan sanamuodon 
mukaiseen tulkintaan. Suomen kielen sana kausi viittaa nimenomaisesti johonkin 
kestonsa perusteella määriteltävissä olevaan ajanjaksoon, jolla on erillinen alkamis- ja 
päättymisajankohta. Tätä tulkintaa tukevat asetuksen muut kieliversiot. 
Englanninkielisessä kieliversiossa käsite kausi on   ”period”   ja   ranskankielisessä 
kieliversiossa  ”période”.     
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Lopuksi vastauksessa todettaisiin, ettei Suomen järjestelmän voida katsoa johtavan 
työntekijän tai ammatinharjoittajan kannalta kohtuuttomaan lopputulokseen. Vaatimus 
neljän viikon tai neljän kuukauden työskentelystä ei ole kohtuuttoman pitkä, mikäli 
henkilö saapuu Suomeen todellisena tarkoituksenaan tehdä täällä työtä.  
 
Asian valmistelu 
 
Asian valmisteluun ovat osallistuneet STM:n, TEM:n, VM:n, Ahvenanmaan 
maakuntahallituksen ja UM:n edustajat.  
 
Asia on käsitelty oikeudelliset kysymykset -jaoston kirjallisessa menettelyssä 8.–9.7.2013. 
 
Esitys 
 
EU-ministerivaliokunnalle esitetään, että Suomi vastaa komissiolle edellä esitettyjä 
päälinjoja noudattaen. 
 
 
 
Yksikön päällikkö   Joni Heliskoski 
 
 
 
LIITTEET   
 
Asiasanat komission valvontamenettely 
Hoitaa UM 
 
Tiedoksi ALR, OM, STM, TEM, VM, VNK 
  
  
 
 
 
IP/13/1107 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
PRESS RELEASE 
Brussels, 20 November 2013 
Social security: Commission refers Finland to Court for 
restricting rights of people that have worked in other 
Member States 
The European Commission has decided to refer Finland to the EU’s Court of Justice for 
requiring workers applying for unemployment benefits to have worked in Finland for at 
least four weeks (or four months of self-employment) as a condition to take into account 
periods of unemployment insurance paid in another Member State. This requirement 
discriminates against workers that have worked in other Member States (both Finns and 
nationals of other Member States) and is in breach of EU law to ensure free movement of 
workers. 
Under EU rules on the coordination of social security schemes to facilitate the free 
movement of workers, Member States have to take into account periods of social security 
insurance paid in other EU countries as though they were periods completed under their 
own legislation. This principle ensures that workers exercising their right to free 
movement are not deprived of social security advantages to which they would have been 
entitled if they had spent their working life in only one Member State. These rules are laid 
down in Article 48(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and specified 
for the purpose of unemployment insurance in Article 61 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
Under this Regulation, Member States are obliged to apply this principle for unemployment 
benefits as soon as the worker concerned joins the unemployment insurance scheme of 
the competent Member State. However, in Finland it is only applied if the worker has 
worked in Finland, immediately before becoming unemployed, for four weeks as an 
employee or four months as self-employed.. This additional requirement affects essentially 
workers that have worked in other Member States, because workers with the same 
employment record who have completed their periods of insurance - in Finland do not 
have to fulfil this additional condition in order to get their employment and insurance 
record recognised by the Finnish unemployment insurance scheme. 
The Commission requested Finland to end this discrimination against workers from other 
Member States in its reasoned opinion of 30 May 2013 (MEMO/13/470), but the Finnish 
authorities have refused to take appropriate measures to comply. 
  2
For more information: 
EU Social Security Coordination  
More information on infringement procedures  
On the general infringement procedure: MEMO/12/12 
On the November infringement package decisions: MEMO/13/1005 
Subscribe to the European Commission's free e-mail newsletter on employment, social 
affairs and inclusion 
László Andor's website  
Follow László Andor on Twitter  
 
 
Contacts : 
Jonathan Todd  (+32 2 299 41 07) 
Cécile Dubois  (+32 2 295 18 83) 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Correspondence with Jonathan Todd, spokesman at European 
Commission, Brussels. Contact person on the Finnish case.  
October 9 2014 
As the conversation with Jonathan Todd was a only a background interview we did not record it. In 
stead we have written down the main points from the conversation. 
Mathilde Nordenlund:  
We are looking for documents related to the Finnish case, where Finland is brought before the 
Court by the Commission for not complying with the rules on social security. Do you know where 
we can find all the documents? 
Jonathan Todd:  
I know the case, but it has not even reached the Court yet, therefore there are only few official 
documents available.  
Mathilde Nordenlund:  
We are in possession of two documents; a press release and a memo. Is that all there is available? 
And when will the case reach the Court? 
Jonathan Todd: 
Yes, that are all the official EU documents there are available now, and we still do not know then 
the case will reach the Court.  
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